Lebanese Consociation

Assessing Accountability and Representativeness

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<td>Amal Movement (Harakat Amal)</td>
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<td>Ba’ath</td>
<td>Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party (Hezb al-Ba’ath al-Arabi al-Isbitiraki)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLM</td>
<td>Democratic Left Movement (Harakatu-l-Yasari-d-Dimuqrati)</td>
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<td>DR</td>
<td>Democratic Renewal (Harakat al-Tajadod al-Dimuqrati)</td>
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<td>FPM</td>
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<td>FNC</td>
<td>Free National Current (Tayyar al-Watani al-Horr)</td>
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<td>Future</td>
<td>Future Tide Movement (Tayyar al-Mostaqbel)</td>
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<td>GoC</td>
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<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>Party of God (Hezbollah)</td>
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<td>JI</td>
<td>Islamic Community (al-Jama’a al-Islamyya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kata’ib</td>
<td>The Phalanges (al-Kata’ib al-Lubnaniya)</td>
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<td>LCP</td>
<td>Lebanese Communist Party (Hizbu-sh-Shuy’i-l-Lubnani)</td>
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<td>LF</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces (al-Quwat al-Lubnaniya)</td>
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<td>NB</td>
<td>National Bloc Party (al-Kutla al-Wataniyya)</td>
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<td>NLP</td>
<td>National Liberal Party (Hezb al-Abrar al-Watani)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Movement (al-Hezb al-Taqdimi al-Isbitiraki)</td>
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<tr>
<td>QSG</td>
<td>Qurnet Shehwan Gathering (Liga’ Qornet Shebwan)</td>
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<td>SIPP</td>
<td>Society of Islamic Philanthropic Projects (al-Abbash)</td>
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<td>SSNP</td>
<td>Syrian Social Nationalist Party (al-Hezb al-Qaumi al-Ijtima’I al-Suri)</td>
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1 Democratic Consociations: A Contradiction in Terms?

“The current situation is symbolic of the dead end of the political leadership and a crisis of representativeness. The crisis demonstrates the consociational system’s ambiguity.”

(Fadia Kiwan 2007 [Interview], my translation)

The state of the art literature on accountability and representativeness contends that consociationalism weakens accountability but strengthens representativeness. This study aims at assessing empirically these hypotheses by studying the case of Lebanon. As a plural society with a long history of consociation, Lebanon is an interesting case in this context. Gaining independence in 1943, Lebanon was relatively stable until the outbreak of civil war in 1975. It ended in 1990. The peace agreement of 1989, the Ta’if Agreement, solidified consociationalism at an institutional level and gave Syria a privileged role in national security matters despite lack of consensus among all the sects.

This thesis makes three main arguments. First, it concurs that consociational institutions in Lebanon have lead to weak accountability. The institutional structure of Lebanon’s executive power has limited Parliament’s monitoring and control of the executive. Mutual veto, intended to protect minorities, has lead to conflict and stalemate in Lebanese state institutions. The electoral system has resulted in an absence of competition through cross-ideological, short term, and tactical alliances. Second, the thesis modifies the argument that consociational systems lead to representativeness. Representation of the sects, descriptive representativeness, has partly been guaranteed in the post-war period, albeit overrepresentation of minorities deviates from proportionality. The substantive representativeness of political elites, however, is substantially reduced. Political elites are substantively representative if they mirror voters’ opinions. The Christian community, especially, has felt excluded and unrepresented in the post-war period. Inability to address economic and social disparities and widespread
corruption further undermine substantive representativeness. Third, on this basis the thesis argues that Lebanon predominantly has been what O’Leary (2003, 2005) terms an undemocratic consociation in the post-war period.

The study starts with a historical and empirical presentation of Lebanese consociation. In order to empirically assess political elites’ accountability and representativeness in Lebanon, it is necessary to build a solid theoretical framework to guide the study. I conducted 19 interviews with top elected officials in the Lebanese Cabinet and Parliament, as well as prominent experts from academia and civil society, during a two-month field-stay. Interview data is supplemented by secondary literature. The analysis applies the theoretical framework on Lebanon.

The study’s backdrop is found in the need to find institutional responses to achieve democratic stability in plural societies such as Bosnia, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, and Lebanon (Roeder and Rotchild 2005:1–6). Of the various power-sharing arrangements, the consociational power-sharing approach has been touted as the most successful at achieving democratic stability (Lijphart 1977; Nordlinger 1972; O’Leary 2003). Advocates of consociationalism assume that plural societies can be stable and democratic as a result of political elites’ efforts to avoid competitive practices of majoritarian democracy (Daalder 1974:607). Therefore, the key provisions of consociation intend to reduce inter-sectarian competition, and to give sectarian elites predominance and autonomy to bargain among themselves (Lijphart 1977). The provisions call for an executive grand coalition including all significant segmental groups; proportional representation of segmental groups in the distribution of legislative seats and in selected offices; segmental autonomy through federalism or other devices; and mutual veto through decision making (Ibid; Reilly 2001; Horowitz 1985).

To Arend Lijphart, consociation is a type of democracy. Yet, consociationalism is criticized for taking the democratic nature of such institutional arrangements for granted (e.g. Daalder 1974; Barry 1975; Lustick 1979, 1997). Several scholars voice concern over consociationalism’s effects on the quality of democracy (e.g. Lustick 1997; Van Schendelen 1984; and Roeder and Rotchild 2005). Critics have asserted that consociationalism impedes democratic consolidation in a long term perspective (Roeder
and Rotchild 2005; Jarstad 2006a). Presumably, consociational institutions challenge democracy because autonomous elite rule involves ‘firm control’ over the masses and prevents people from political participation (Barry 1975; Daalder 1974:608; Lustick 1997:108). On this basis, critics question whether consociationalism is democratic at all.

Proponents of consociationalism have responded to the criticism in two ways. First, some claim that consociationalism is compatible with democracy but corresponds to an alternative democratic ideal. Ruby Andeweg (2000) responds in this way, taking as his reference point Robert A. Dahl’s (1971) two-dimensional definition of democracy as \textit{competition} and \textit{inclusiveness}. Andeweg (2000:530) maintains that elite autonomy and cooperation do not hinder electoral competition. Moreover, Andeweg holds that consociationalism may outperform competitive majoritarian democracy as consociation’s main objective is inclusion of all the significant segments of a plural society in government.

Second, some argue that consociations can be either \textit{democratic} or \textit{undemocratic}. Brendan O’Leary (2003, 2005) argues for distinguishing between these by the \textit{accountability} and \textit{representativeness} of political elites. In undemocratic consociations “political leaders of communities co-operate and conduct themselves according to consociational but not democratic practices” (O’Leary 2003:698). Moreover, undemocratic consociations have “complete or factional cartels, in which each segmental partner is controlled by an elite or faction that is not democratically controlled within its own constituency” (Ibid). Power is shared among the elites “with little or no reference to their bloc” (O’Leary 2003:698). In contrast, in democratic consociations nothing “precludes intra-bloc democratic competition, or the turnover of political elites, or shifts of support between parties” O’Leary (2005:11).

In sum, both responses point to two main dimensions or indicators of democracy, \textit{accountability} and \textit{representativeness}, albeit their terminologies differ slightly. Competition can be considered a condition for accountability, and inclusiveness equal in meaning to representativeness. Assessing accountability and representativeness in consociations can therefore determine whether consociations can be democratic or, as critics contend, whether democratic consociations are a contradiction in terms. In fact, if
consociationalism per se impedes accountability and representativeness, democratic consociations are ipso facto non-existent.

In the remaining of the chapter I will specify the study’s research objective, use of theory, and delimitations. Then I define consociation and categorize Lebanon on this basis. Finally, I present and discuss the study’s methodology and research design in light of methodological weaknesses.

1.1 Research Objective, Theory, and Delimitations

This study’s research objective is to empirically assess the hypotheses regarding accountability and representativeness in consociations in Lebanon.

Unfortunately, when distinguishing between democratic and undemocratic consociations, O’Leary (2003, 2005) provides few explicit guidelines for assessing accountability and representativeness. I therefore supplement the definitions given by O’Leary with theoretical contributions from two sets of literature. First, I study the standard literature on representation, accountability, and democratic government. Noteworthy scholarly contributions in this field are Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes’ Democracy, Accountability and Representation (1999), Kaare Strom, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman’s Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (2003), Bingham Powell Jr.’s Elections as Instruments of Democracy (2000), and Phillippe Schmitter’s Parties are not what they once were (2001). Second, I look into the literature that is more specifically about power sharing. Arend Lijphart’s works (e.g. 1969, 1977, 1999), and those of Donald Horowitz (1985, 2002), and Brendan O’Leary (2003, 2005), are important contributions in this field. Arend Lijphart’s Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) is cardinal for the consociational approach to power sharing.
whereas Donald Horowitz’ *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985) is pivotal for moderation-focused incentivism¹.

The theoretical framework identifies certain institutional mechanisms to ensure accountability and representativeness. Elections and political parties both ensure accountability and representativeness although in different ways and forms. A parliamentary opposition is one mechanism to ensure accountability. However, consociations favor representativeness over accountability. The grand coalition is therefore a mechanism to ensure representativeness, but it also limits opposition. The analysis is structured around these institutional mechanisms.

A few delimitations are necessary. Temporally, the thesis restricts the scope of the research to the post-war period (1990–2006). Substantially, the thesis delimitates the scope of research by adopting an ‘outcome understanding’ rather than a ‘control understanding’ of accountability (Strøm et al. 2003). An outcome understanding focuses on holding elected representatives responsible for their performance. Elections are the principal mechanism to ensure outcome accountability. A control understanding sees accountability as a continuous process of controlling representatives in office. Constitutional devices, like the judiciary and the legal framework, ensure control. This thesis concentrates on outcome mechanisms as – although constitutional devices are important – I consider them secondary to institutional mechanisms. Moreover, the thesis studies three consociational provisions – grand coalition, mutual veto, and proportionality – but not segmental autonomy, as I consider it less relevant to political elites’ accountability and representativeness.

¹ Moderation-focused incentivism is also called centripetalism or integrative dynamics.
1.2 Defining Consociation

This thesis adopts Lijphart’s institutional definition of consociation. As we have seen, it comprises four institutional traits. First, the key provision of consociation is government by a grand coalition including the political leaders of all significant segments (Lijphart 1977:25). Various institutional arrangements may constitute grand coalitions as long as the leaders of all significant segments participate (Lijphart 1969:213). Second, segmental autonomy means that segmental groups have autonomy to run their own internal affairs (Lijphart 2002:39). Third, proportionality in the composition of the legislature, public service and in the allocation of public funds defines consociation (Ibid:52). With regard to the electoral system, proportionality dictates some form of proportional representation (PR). But electoral systems can also try to achieve proportionality without straightforward PR. Fourth, mutual veto can be an informal and unwritten understanding, or a formally agreed upon rule (Lijphart 1977:38). It can apply to all decisions or to specified areas only.

1.3 Categorizing Lebanon

Lijphart classifies Lebanon as a consociational democracy from independence in 1943 until the war broke out in 1975, then again after 1989 (1977:147–150; 1996:59). This thesis considers Lebanon a consociation – as do Michael C. Hudson (1988), Elizabeth Picard (1997), Samir Khalaf (1987), and Michael Suleiman (1967) – but is aware of the small deviations from the typical model. Overall, the political system in Lebanon displays the four institutional traits or principles of consociation.

First, in Lebanon the grand coalition comprises several top executive posts instead of ‘a grand coalition cabinet’. The posts of the Presidency, Premiership, and Parliament Speaker, are distributed between the segments. The Presidency is reserved for a Maronite, the Premiership for a Sunni, and the Parliamentary Speakership for a Shiite.
Second, confessional communities are delegated autonomy in most personal status issues, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance (EU EOM 2005). Decentralization is non-territorial and constitutes the main device to delegate power.

Third, Lebanon tries to achieve proportionality by a non-PR method. The legislature is elected by plurality voting, but seats in the legislature and state administration are allocated according to parity (5:5) between Muslims and Christians. The Muslim and Christian seats in all the electoral districts are further allocated to specific confessional communities.

Fourth, mutual veto is formally enshrined in the constitution by demanding a two-thirds majority in certain fundamental questions. Mutual veto also exists informally as top posts are allocated to the three most significant sects. Thus no decision can be made without a Sunni-Shiite-Maronite agreement.

1.4 Methodology

1.4.1 Case Study as Research Method

The case study design seems the most suitable to address the research question as it allows for in-depth study of a case and generalizations if appropriately designed (Yin 2003). The case study is “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units” (Gerring 2004:342). The thesis understands the case study as a method, as a way of defining cases (Gerring 2004). Lebanon is thus conceived of as a case of a larger class of phenomena, consociations. The study therefore seeks to stress the general rather than the unique features of the consociational system in Lebanon.

The study’s main objective is to develop and modify existing theory on power sharing and democratization. A hypothesis-generating design is thus suitable for my research objective (See Andersen 1997:35). The data collection is guided by theory. Personal informant interviews and secondary literature are employed as data collection
strategies. My research strategy is to analyze the empirical evidence in light of the theoretical framework built on theories of representation in general and power sharing in particular. Aspects of these theories are applied to, and tested on, Lebanon to explain shortcomings in accountability and representativeness. The theoretical framework addresses prospects and challenges to accountability and representativeness in democracies and in consociations especially.

1.4.2 Data Collection

Data collection is based on two strategies: a review of secondary literature, and individual semi-structured interviews, conducted over two months in Lebanon. Secondary literature used includes books, reports, articles, newspapers, and statistics.

The collection, presentation, and analysis of statistics constituted a particular methodological challenge. A lack of official statistics, and sources that contradicted one another necessitated that statistics be evaluated thoroughly before use. This was demonstrated in the presentation of the 2005 election results. As-Safir, El-Mustaqbel, and An-Nabar – three major newspapers – showed different results (EU EOM 2005). For instance, Rafic Hariri’s Future Tide Movement got 20 percent according to the Hariri-backed paper El-Mustaqbel whereas it got 9 percent according to the Hezbollah/Amal-backed paper As-Safir. Assessing sources’ credibility and methods was therefore crucial due to political bias and shortcomings in the legal framework, especially concerning party membership. For the parliamentary elections prior to 2005 I have relied on Farid Al-Khazen (2003). For 2005 election statistics I look at the EU Election Observation Mission data. However, election statistics are not given a prominent place in the thesis as a systematic analysis was hindered by lack of comparative data. Population numbers are based on reliable sources such as the EU EOM (2005), Rania Maktabi (1999), Hanna Ziadeh (2006), and the CIA Factbook (2008).

During a two-month field-stay in Lebanon I conducted 19 individual semi-structured interviews. Additionally, the stay increased my knowledge and understanding of Lebanese politics and society. It also gave me the opportunity to carry out several informal conversations, and attend seminars and informal meetings. Only the formal
interviews serve as the basis for comparisons and are explicitly used in the data analysis. I applied the so-called interview guide approach (See Mikkelsen 1995:103). I formulated three main guides – for experts, deputies, and cabinet members respectively. The guides were used to ensure that all interviewees were asked about central topics. This enabled a more systematic data analysis and comparison in order to find general patterns. Still, the interview style remains fairly conversational and allows for the follow up of topics arising during the interview.

The selection of interviewees was based on theoretical and methodological considerations. The interviews were arranged after arriving, though facilitated through several contacts from a previous stay in Lebanon. Twelve interviews were conducted with politicians (deputies, cabinet members, former politicians, or politicians without office) and 7 interviews with experts (academics, NGO staff, and journalists). A full list of interviewees is provided in Appendix 1.

Interviewees’ representativeness on a number of demographic characteristics was emphasized. Because cleavages exist in plural societies, the representation of the most significant groups seemed especially important. The selection aimed at achieving a fairly even distribution of interviewees according to confession and geography. Among the politicians were Shiite, Sunni, Druze, Maronite, Armenian Orthodox, and Greek Catholic, thus covering the most significant sects. All the regions (South, North, Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and Beqa’) are represented.

Interviewees’ substantive representativeness was also taken into account. I focused on finding experienced and knowledgeable politicians when choosing interviewees (Rubin and Rubin 2005:64–67). I interviewed politicians from the opposition and the majority in Parliament. Within the majority, representatives were interviewed from the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), Future Tide Movement (Future), Kata’ib, the Democratic Left Movement (DLM), and the National Liberal Party (NLP). Within the opposition, one deputy for the Free Patriotic Movement was interviewed but unfortunately it proved impossible to arrange a formal interview with either Hezbollah or Amal representatives. However, I interviewed representatives who belong to their bloc in parliament and who were well informed about Hezbollah’s and Amal’s viewpoints and organizations. The
political situation in Lebanon throughout November and December was tense, and made it more challenging to arrange formal meetings with Hezbollah and Amal representatives.

Opinions differ as to whether it is better to take notes or use a recorder (Rubin and Rubin 2005:110). I chose to use a recorder in order to better concentrate on listening and asking follow-up questions. Recording interviews also gives benefits in terms of accuracy and responsiveness. But using a recorder can also restrain the interviewees. Yet, my interviewees did not express any hesitation and soon forgot about the recorder. Most interviewees are public and well-known figures, exposed to researchers and media. Interviewees are named according to their own wishes; permission to quote and to record was requested before interviewing.

A solid theoretical framework and multiple data sources strengthen the validity of the study’s data (Andersen 1997; Yin 2003). Construct validity is maintained by the collection of supplementary data from secondary literature and interviews. However, interviews can produce biased data because politicians portray themselves as more accountable and representative than they really are, so-called “interviewer effects”. Comparing data from interviews with politicians with data from the expert interviews may expose possible interviewer effects. Such systematic comparison may compensate for interviewer effects and improve the general conclusions drawn. Politicians’ geographical and confessional variations also control for differences related to region or confession. Furthermore, the methodological weaknesses of some statistics, election statistics in particular, are taken into consideration. Yet, in general, the empirical sources used in the study are considered correct. The interview data and secondary literature data have confirmed each other and thus increase the chance that these are correct.

Reliability is enhanced by specifying my theoretical approach, data types, and the analysis of empirical sources. This means that other investigators should arrive at the same findings and conclusions if the study were conducted again (Yin 2003:37–39). The references to secondary literature and statistics allow another researcher to independently examine the source. However, replicating interview data is more challenging. Interviewees may respond differently at another time and under other
circumstances. The use of secondary literature partly compensates for this methodological weakness.

1.4.3 Generalizing Internally and Externally

This study aims at drawing descriptive and causal inferences. Qualitative data constitute its main source. Qualitative data often entail causal complexity as it is difficult to separate the studied phenomenon from its context (Andersen 1997). This thesis argues that consociationalism affects accountability and representativeness. Achieving control in case studies constitutes a methodological challenge to internal validity. Because the study is guided by a solid theoretical framework, ensuring analytical control, its internal validity is strengthened (Ibid:16). Additionally, rival explanations, or other possible independent variables are discussed in the analysis, according to Yin’s criteria (2003:34, 36). For instance, the Syrian influence and the societal structure constitute complementary independent variables. However, case studies cannot measure partial correlations. Analyzing the empirical evidence and comparing the study’s findings to theory enable an approximate assessment of the relative importance of the variables. Case studies can thus contribute to knowledge of causal mechanisms whereas they cannot do so concerning causal effects (Gerring 2004:348). Furthermore, the study makes several observations while analyzing some parliamentary elections. Increasing the number of observations enhance internal validity (King et al. 1994:116–117). Regarding some causal relationships, the variable ‘Syrian influence’ can be controlled for by comparing observations prior to 2005 with the 2005 observations. These analytical tactics increase internal validity.

The classical objection to single case studies concerns whether it is possible to generalize from one case (Andersen 1997). This study aims at making an analytical generalization, i.e. to develop and modify theory. It therefore compares the empirical results to existing theory. Especially, the study aims at developing and modifying power-sharing theory in order to learn more about consociations as a class of phenomena and certain conditions for accountability and representativeness in consociations (Andersen

1.5 The Structure of the Thesis

The second chapter introduces the background for Lebanese power sharing, the post-war political context, and the electoral system. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework applied to assess accountability and representativeness. Chapters 4 through 6 constitute the analysis. These chapters are divided into two parts. The first part analyzes accountability and the second part analyzes representativeness. Chapter 4 analyzes the grand coalition, mutual veto and parliamentary opposition. Chapter 5 analyzes elections and proportionality focusing upon alliance making, whereas chapter 6 analyzes political parties. The last chapter summarizes, and concludes with regard to the research objective.
2 Lebanese Power Sharing

At the beginning of the 20th century Lebanon was pictured as an ideal of inter-communal national coexistence and liberal prosperity. At the end of the century, however, it was seen as a typical example of a disintegrated and failed state (Ziadeh 2006:3). Lebanese society and elites were torn apart by the long years of civil war from 1975 to 1990 (El-Solh 2006:xiv). The Ta’if Agreement of 1989 intended to create a new national consensus yet failed. Instead, it solidified the consociational system at the institutional level, but not at the national level. Additionally, the agreement’s implementation has been flawed which enabled Syrian hegemony until 2005 (Haddad 2002). Thus, the post-war transition did not lead to a viable democracy, but rather to an unstable and faulted one in which both accountability and representativeness have suffered. Today Lebanon is at a crossroads. The Syrian pull-out in 2005 inaugurated a critical period and mounting challenges. Since 2005, Lebanese state institutions have been increasingly unable to perform their duties due to political crises.

This chapter describes the background of Lebanese power sharing to later use it for case analysis. The chapter starts by analyzing Lebanon’s confessional segmental structure and that structure’s demographic features. It thereafter studies the previous power-sharing arrangements, and the current arrangement implemented through the Ta’if Agreement. Then an overview of the post-war political context is given. Finally, it outlines and explains the post-war electoral laws. The background is essential in order to use Lebanon as a case in the analysis.
2.1 Confessionalism

With several confessional communities, Lebanon is a typical case of a plural society. There are seventeen institutionalized confessional communities (Azar 1999:35; EU EOM 2005:12). Among these are 12 Christian (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Chaldean, Nestorian, Syriac, Jacobites, Latin, Protestant, and Copt), four Muslim (Shiite, Sunni, Druze, and Alawite), and one is Jewish. Additionally, there are two non-institutionalized communities, the Ishmaelite and the secular community, recognized in 1936 (EU EOM 2005). The institutionalized communities are delegated autonomy in most personal status issues and have their own sectarian courts (See 1.5).

Confessionalism permeates Lebanese society on many levels. Beydoun (cited in Azar 1999:36, my translation) defines a confessional community as “a social multiple functional formation that polarizes numerous aspects of its members’ existence”. Community membership is mandatory from birth (Azar 1999:37). The confessional communities can be understood as “mutually separated political subcultures” (Almond cited in Lijphart 1977:6). This implies that societal actors – political parties, interest groups, organizations, media, and schools – typically organize along such cleavages in a plural society. Lebanese society is thus a fragmented political culture.

In this context, demographics play an important role since the power-sharing regime is based on a confessional allocation of seats in the Parliament. The last official census was conducted in 1932 (See Table 1). The sectarian allocation of seats was based on the census until altered by the constitutional amendments in the 1989 power-sharing agreement (Maktabi 1999:220).

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2 The terminology associated with plural societies is vast. The segments in Lebanon are sometimes referred to as sects, confessions, or confessional communities.
Table 1: Resident and Emigrant Lebanese Citizens by Confessional Community According to the 1932 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confession</th>
<th>Residents in percent of total resident citizens (amount)</th>
<th>Confession in percent of total Lebanese citizenry, emigrants and residents (amount)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>28.7 (227,800)</td>
<td>33.5 (351,197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>9.7 (77,312)</td>
<td>12.8 (134,343)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>5.9 (46,709)</td>
<td>7.3 (76,336)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>4.0 (31,992)</td>
<td>3.3 (34,416)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian (a)</td>
<td>1.7 (13,133)</td>
<td>1.6 (16,498)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Christian</td>
<td>50 (396,946)</td>
<td>58.5 (612,790)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>22.5 (178,100)</td>
<td>18.6 (195,305)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>19.5 (155,035)</td>
<td>15.9 (166,536)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>6.7 (53,334)</td>
<td>5.9 (62,084)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Muslim</td>
<td>48.7 (387,469)</td>
<td>40.4 (423,934)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Christian (b)</td>
<td>1.3 (9,981)</td>
<td>1.1 (11,659)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (793,396)</td>
<td>100 (1,048,383)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The table is based on Maktabi (1999).

(a) The category 'other Christians' includes Protestants, Syriac Catholics, Syriac Orthodox, Chaldean Orthodox.

(b) The category resident 'other non-Christians' includes 3588 Jews and 6393 other persons labelled ‘miscellaneous’ in the 1932 census.

Demographics have changed since the 1932 census, especially due to the high birth rate among Muslim communities, and to Christian emigration (Azar 1999). Underrepresented sects therefore demand a new census in order to get a more proportional sectarian distribution. This concerns the Muslims in general and the Shiites in particular. Demographics are thus heavily politicized. A reexamining of the census indicates that the apparent Christian majority was controversial as it was based on the exclusion of considerable numbers of residents as well as inclusion of a significant number of emigrants (Maktabi 1999). Thus the underrepresentation of certain sects, most notably that of the Shiites, was not a result of evolving demographics only, but also a means to secure and legitimize Christian political dominance. Today the most influential confessional groups are considered to be Sunnis, Maronites, Druzes, Shiites, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholics (Azar 1999:41; EU EOM 2005:12). There is no new official census, but the Ministry of Interior yearly updates the registry of the voting
population (EU EOM 2005) (See Table 2). The registry does not take into account whether the voter resides in Lebanon or abroad. The EU EOM estimates that one million registered voters live abroad. The numbers reported in Table 2 are supported by the CIA World Factbook (2008) reporting 59.7 percent Muslims, 39 percent Christian, and 1.3 percent other.

Table 2: Registered voters in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confession</th>
<th>Percent (Amount)</th>
<th>Registered Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>22.2 (667,556)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>7.9 (236,402)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>5.2 (156,521)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>3.7 (110,892)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0.6 (17,409)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Christians</td>
<td>39.6 (1,188,780)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>26.4 (795,233)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>26.1 (783,903)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>5.6 (169,293)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alawite</td>
<td>0.8 (23,696)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Muslims</td>
<td>58.9 (1,772,125)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities*</td>
<td>1.5 (47,018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0 (3,007,927)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The table is based on figures from the EU EOM Report (2005).

*Chaldean, Nestorain, Syriac, Jacobites, Latin, Copt, and Jews.

2.2 Lebanon’s Power-Sharing Agreements

The modern Lebanese state has historical roots that predate its formal creation in 1920 (Kingston & Zahar 2008:84, forthcoming). Lebanon was a distinct political entity based on a dynasty of local overlords joining Maronites and Druzes in Mount Lebanon already in the 16th century (Cobban 1987:35). The Ma’an Amir (Prince), Fakhr el-Din II (1585–1635), was pivotal for the development of the inter-sectarian system in Mount Lebanon (Ibid:37). The Ottoman Empire divided Mount Lebanon into two administrative units in 1843 (Ofeish 1999). These units were headed respectively by Maronite and Druze administrators. The Ottomans and the Europeans later jointly intervened again, in 1860,
to impose a power-sharing agreement between the two communities to unify Mount Lebanon under a new system, the *mutassarrifiyya*. The *mutassarrifiyya* reinforced the principle of sectarian representation.

In 1920 France secured its mandate over Lebanon and created Greater Lebanon, *Lubnaan al-Kabiir* (Salibi 1989:131). The creation of Greater Lebanon resulted from internal Lebanese and external factors (Ziadeh 2006:87–88). It was a result of both the Ottoman Empire’s demise after the First World War and the Christian majority’s wish for political self-assertion. Lebanon was invoked as a non-Muslim enclave that could reform the “backward Muslim and Asiatic region”, and function as a “terre d’asile” to the Christian populations of the Middle East (Makdisi 1996:24).

However, the Christian Maronites were unsuccessful in creating an exclusively Christian homeland (Ziadeh 2006:88). The Beqa’ Valley and Beirut province were joined to the governorate of Mount Lebanon’s total population of only 300,000, consisting of Maronites, Druze, and some Greek Catholics (Picard 1996:32). The expanded territory now included Sunnis, Shiites, and Greek Orthodox. The Muslim communities, led by the urban Sunni elite, resisted the new state and its Christian identity. Their alternative national project was based on a history of Arabic national awareness that involved inclusion in an Arab nation state in the form of the Ottoman *wilayaat* or a less expansive one in a Greater Syria. The 1926 Constitution declared Lebanon a presidential parliamentary democracy.

The French Mandate ended with Lebanon’s independence in 1943. At this time the sectarian system was fully developed (Ofeish 1999). The oral National Pact (*al Mithaq al Watani*) between Bishara al-Khoury and Riad al-Solh, representing the Maronite community and the urban-based Sunni merchants respectively, consolidated the sectarian system. The Pact came after a period of intense communal confrontation (Ziadeh 2006:111). It was partly a result of the Christian fear of being dominated by the

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3 The cantons of Safita and Hosn in the prefecture of Tripoli were not included (Picard 1996:32).
Muslim communities and the surrounding Arab countries, and the Muslims’ fear of Western hegemony (USIP 2006). First, the National Pact gave Lebanon an Arab face or orientation (*wajh ‘arabii*) but no definite national identity, thus suspending both the Maronite and the Greater Arab nation projects (Ziadeh 2006:116). Second, it preserved the Maronite Presidency, Sunni Premiership, and Shiite Parliamentary Speakership. The Deputy Parliamentary Speakership was allocated to the Greek Orthodox. Third, it stipulated that deputies be at a ratio of 6:5 (Christians to Muslims) based on each community’s numerical size in the 1932 Census⁴ (Ziadeh 2006:117). The Pact therefore extended and legitimized the established confessional allocation of political, judicial, and administrative positions based on the 1926 Constitution, Article 95 (Ibid:117). Although a Maronite-Sunni compromise now was at the core of the power-sharing formula (instead of a Druze-Maronite) the arrangement reinforced the Maronite hegemony as the ultimate executive authority was still concentrated in the Maronite Presidency (Ibid:114–115).

In 1975, civil war broke out in Lebanon, which lasted fifteen years. There were both internal and external reasons for the war. First, the privileged status of Maronites over Muslims, including the increase in the Muslim population, the rise of an intelligentsia supportive of pan-Arabism, and elite failure to handle regional and socio-economic disparities, are seen as important causes of the civil war (Ziadeh 2006). In this view, the causes of regime failure are ascribed to the deficiencies of the power-sharing arrangement and its inability to regulate elite discord, and to deal with social mobilization and demographic changes (Seaver 2000). Second, regional instability, in particular, the escalation of the Arab-Israeli dispute after 1967 and its Palestinian dimension, is considered a primary cause (Ibid; Khalaf 2002). Arab nationalism and its synergy with Palestinian nationalism strained the elite consensus upon which power sharing is based. This perspective emphasizes that it was not the system’s centrifugal tendencies per se, but the ‘internalization of communal conflict’ that caused regime collapse (Khalaf 2002).

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⁴ Maktalı (1999) claims that the Christian majority was controversial based on her reexamination of the 1932 census (See section 3.1).
Are Knudsen (2005) distinguishes contributions that focus on the following factors: economic (Makdisi and Sadaka 2002), political (Khazen 2000), social (Johnson 2001), and regional (O’Ballance 1998). For the purpose of this thesis, it suffices to say that a complex relationship between such factors contributed to Lebanese regime failure.

The Document of National Understanding of 1989, the Ta’if Agreement, was negotiated at the end of the civil war, and modified the ‘rules of the game’ of the 1943 power-sharing arrangement. However, it did not alter its basic character (Hudson 1999:27). In fact, the agreement had a dual character: it reinforced the sectarian political system but it called for its gradual abolishment. There were several reasons. According to Sami Ofeish (1999:104), the new preamble to the Constitution based on the Ta’if Agreement reflected three underlying causes of the civil war. First, it addressed the national identity conflict. The 1943 National Pact stressed Lebanon’s dual relationship to the West and Arab countries, while the preamble stressed the Arab identity of Lebanon. However, it also rejected any partition of Lebanon and underlined sectarian coexistence. Second, it addressed the socioeconomic differences and called for “social justice and equality between citizens” and even development between regions (Ibid). Third, it called for the abolishment of sectarianism through a piecemeal plan. Despite the latter, the preamble solidified the political system’s confessional nature as it declared parity in the distribution of seats in parliament between Muslims and Christians, and the proportional distribution of seats between the confessions within the Muslim and Christian communities respectively. However, the meaning of ‘proportional’ is controversial since demographic changes were not taken into account in the distribution (Ziadeh 2006:141).

The preamble rearranged the power relations between the communities and between the top state leaders (Ziadeh 2006:140–143). The Sunni Premiership was strengthened on behalf of the Presidency and was from now on clearly the one heading the Council of Ministers and acting as its representative. Several of the Maronite President’s prerogatives were removed. The Shiite-held Parliamentary Speakership was also empowered, extending its term from one year to two years. The President’s authority to dissolve the Parliament was removed, thus strengthening the Parliament, and also tipping the institutional balance of power in favour of Parliament (Salloukh 2007). In fact, the constitutional amendments in Ta’if equipped Lebanon with ‘three
presidents’ in the *Troika*. The President is the head of state, but executive power lies mainly in the Council of Ministers. Decision-making power is shared between the President and the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers. The presidents therefore “share power almost equally, though in different capacities” (Ofeish 1999:104).

The Ta’if Agreement was brokered by Saudi Arabia with “the discreet participation by the United States and behind-the-scenes influence from Syria” (Hudson 1999:27). The agreement provided Syria with a privileged role in matters of national security. But on the condition that Lebanon hold presidential elections, form a new cabinet, and execute several ‘reforms’, the accord stipulated that Syria redeploy its forces within two years. Two years later, Syria refused to do so, arguing that Lebanon had not enforced all the political reforms, such as deconfessionalizing the political system (Ibid:28). In fact, international and regional developments would help Syria solidify its stronghold over Lebanon.

### 2.2.1 Election Procedures of the *Troika*

The President is elected indirectly by a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Thus the aim is to elect a consensus candidate with support across communities. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President in consultation with the Parliament Speaker on the basis of a binding parliamentary consultation (Ta’if Agreement 1989 found in Ziadeh (2006), Appendix L: Article 1.2.٦). The President issues the decree appointing the Prime Minister (Ibid: Article 1.2.٧). In agreement with the Prime Minister, the President issues the decree forming the Council of Ministers (Ibid: Article 1.2.٨). The Parliament Speaker is elected by Parliament for the duration of its term (Ibid: Article 1.1.2.١).

### 2.3 The Political Context

The war between 1975 and 1990 left Lebanon in ruins. It was extremely bloody and many atrocities were committed (Knudsen 2005:1; Khalaf 2002). Thus, democratic transition needed to take into account communal fear and the need to protect minorities.
Post-war reconciliation and democratization in plural societies have normally “involved establishing a democratic political system, reviving political parties and holding elections” (Manning cited in Knudsen 2005:5). Yet, Knudsen (Ibid:5–6) describes a state of worrying democratic deficit in post-war Lebanon. Both the accountability and the representativeness of the political elite to the citizenry have been severely flawed.

The post Tai’f political elite was composed of former militia members and leaders, businessmen, professionals, and religious figures (Gebara 2006:3). Former warlords’ privileges were maintained and many were integrated into the new leadership (Adwan cited in Gebara 2007:10). Political leadership in pre-war Lebanon was associated with honor and patriarchy (Johnson 2001, Sharabi 1988). Features and organization of political leadership varied according to community and region. In rural areas, political leaders were feudal lords whose legitimacy stemmed from family genealogies whereas in the cities the political leaders (zu’ama) came from notable merchant families of more recent ascension (Johnson 2001:25). A za’im (plural zu’ama) was a sociopolitical leader. They were often powerful parliamentarians, who operated as patriarchal political leaders at the head of a clientele (Ibid:28). However, the civil war replaced the pre-war zu’ama clientelism with a new complex mix of clientelistic networks around militias, parties, and Islamist groups (Hamzeh cited in Knudsen 2005:4). The government still functions as a system based on exchanging favors, and Lebanese politics are thus grounded in clientelism and personal enrichment (Haddad cited in Ibid). The integration of warlords into the state led to state disintegration and weakened accountability as the government acted as the agent of individual and sectarian interests (Picard cited in Gebara 2007:10–11). State disintegration has contributed to institutionalize corruption in the post-war years (Gebara 2007:18).

According to Knudsen (2005:5–6) the Lebanese political system is an “oligarchy where party politics doesn’t exist, political leaders are marginalized and most parties without partisans.” The transition to post-war democracy in Lebanon was supposed to be governed by the Ta’if Agreement which demanded the demobilization of all militias, a timetable for Syrian redeployment and withdrawal, an end to Israeli occupation, and political and administrative reforms. Yet, Syria managed to establish and later consolidate a proxy security regime in Lebanon in the post-war period despite the
provisions of the Ta’if Agreement (Salloukh 2007). Two factors decreased US and Saudi Arabian influence in Lebanon – despite their role in the power-sharing agreement – and subsequently empowered the Syrian regime. First, the inter-Christian struggle between the interim PM General Michel Aoun and the *Lebanese Forces (LF)* neutralized their ability to ensure the Syrian withdrawal. Second, the US’ desire to include Syria in their coalition against Iraq after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 ended the US and Saudi roles as third parties overseeing the Syrian redeployment. The Syrian regime infiltrated the political society and ensured political forces’ subservience by various institutional techniques (Ibid; Favier 2006).

The transition from war to democracy was abrupt, and political parties that acted as militias during the civil war only slowly ceased wartime practices (Al-Khazen 2003:612). Syrian political domination marginalized the Christian post-war community. Christian opposition toward the Syrian occupation mounted after the Ta’if Agreement. Most Maronites and large segments of other Christian communities opposed the ’selective’, ’incomplete’ and ’faulty’ implementation of the Ta’if Agreement (Ziadeh 2006:153).

The Christian *nationalist* parties, the Kata’ib, the *National Liberal Party (NLP)*, and the *National Bloc* were weakened by internal power struggles, family vendettas within the leading Franjieh, Gemayel, and Chamoun families, and electoral boycott (Knudsen 2005:6). Fragmentation of political leadership and the Christian nationalist parties’ decline in power led to the organization of Christian opposition to the Syrian military presence under the leadership of the Maronite Church (Ziadeh 2006:153; Knudsen 2005:6). This was embodied in the massive *mubay’a* (declaration of allegiance) to the Maronite Patriarch.

Large parts of the Christian elite boycotted elections in 1992 and 1996 but returned with some force in the 2000 election (Ziadeh 2006:153). The increasing Christian opposition to Syrian hegemony in Lebanon led to the formation of the *Qurnet Shehwan Gathering (QSG)* in 2001, which demanded a timetable for the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2003 (Knudsen 2005:6). The coalition, under Patriarch Sfeir’s initiative, gathered 29 Christian politicians from different political groups (Lebanonwire
The relation toward the Syrian regime created conflict in the Christian community. Within the Kata’ib for instance, it led to the formation of two other factions, *Reform Kata’ib* lead by Amine Gemayel and *Opposition Kata’ib* by Elias Karamé.

The Lebanese *ultra-nationalist* parties were subject to official persecution by the Syrian regime (Knudsen 2005:6–7). The *Lebanese Forces (LF)*, which had been the main militia on the Christian side during the war, dissolved as a political party and its leader, Samir Geagea, was jailed for eleven years (1994–2005). Aoun, former General of the Lebanese Army and now leader of the *Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)*, left for exile in France for fourteen years (1991–2005). The right-wing militia, the *Guardians of the Cedars (GoC)*, was banned and its leader sentenced to death. Today, the *FPM* and the *LF* mobilize a large part of the Christian community.

Contrary to the Christian parties, the three main Muslim parties in the post-war period – *Hezbollah, Amal Movement (Amal)*, and the *Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)* – thrived under Syrian occupation (Knudsen 2005:7). Within the Shiite community *Hezbollah* has transformed from a radical, clandestine militia, established in the civil war’s latter period, to a moderate, mainstream political party with an armed resistance wing (Harik 2004:1). It is the only wartime militia that hasn’t disarmed (Droz-Vincent 2007:29). Their ‘Islamic resistance’ (*al-muqawama al-islamiyya*) centered on the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon until its end in 2000 and thereafter on the liberation of the Shebaa farms. Moreover, claims of deep faith and a literal interpretation of the Quran underlie the party’s actions (Harik 2004:1). Currently, the party no longer strives to create an Islamic Republic, but rather an Islamic situation (*al-hala al-islamiyya*) (Droz-Vincent 2007:29). *Hezbollah’s* adoption of modern political techniques and its extensive social work have earned it respect (Harik 2004:4).

The other main Shiite party, *Amal*, emerged from the *Movement of the Deprived*, a social movement for Shiite emancipation – led by Imam Moussa Sadr. *Amal* was created as the military wing of the movement (Lebanonwire [15.04.08b]). In the post-war period, the party has remained politically influential because of party leader Nabih Berri’s tenure as Parliament Speaker (Knudsen 2005:7). Its program is secular.
Within the Druze community, the PSP has emerged as the main party; it has prospered far beyond what would seem proportionate given the sect’s demographic share (Knudsen 2005:7). Originally a cross-sectarian socialist party, it became more sectarian in nature in the post-war period (Richani 1998).

During the post-war period, Hariri’s Future Tide Movement (Future) emerged as the main Sunni political actor. Hariri was central in the Ta’if Agreement. Contrary to the former Sunni elite, oriented toward the Greater Arab Nation and pan-Arabism, Hariri’s aspirations for the Sunni community looked inwards (Ziadeh 2006:155). The Syrian regime tried to contain Harirism, and thereby French and Saudi Arabian influence by supporting Hariri’s rivals, the old Beiruti families such as the Solhs. Nonetheless, Hariri’s influence increased steadily from 1992. He formed five cabinets before he was assassinated on February 14, 2005 (Lebanonwire [18.02.08]) (See Appendix 2 for an overview of main political parties and leaders in the post-war period).

There were several important political changes in the Lebanese political landscape from around 2000 due to international, regional, and domestic factors (EU EOM 2005:20–23). The liberation of South Lebanon in 2000, the death of Hafez el-Assad in Syria, and the end of the US-Syrian partnership after the Gulf War constitute essential events in the context of mounting polarization since 2000. The turning point took place in 2004 when the UN Security Council enacted Resolution 1559. It called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the disarmament of all militias. The following day the Parliament extended President Emile Lahoud’s mandate. This was part of Syria’s strategy to consolidate its control over Lebanon because it felt threatened by the increasingly aggressive role of the US after the US-Syrian rupture over Iraq (Droz-Vincent 2007:27). These events triggered the Cedar Revolution and greater political freedom. Since then, two coalitions have emerged gradually, the opposition and the loyalist camps (EU EOM 2005:20).

The assassination of Hariri in February 2005 sparked a cycle of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations (Patric and Espanol 2007a). The opposition, later named the March 14 Alliance (March 14), gathered anti-Syrian forces that demanded independence from Syria. The opposition included Hariri’s and Jumblatt’s parliamentary
blocs, as well as LF, the reunited Kata’ib, most members of QSG, FPM, Democratic Left Movement (DLM), Democratic Renewal (DR), and several independent deputies (Salloukh 2007:28, fn 117). Initially, Hezbollah and Amal stayed on the sidelines although many Shiites sympathized with the movement. The pro-Syrian Karami Cabinet was destabilized and resigned on February 28. On March 8 Hezbollah and Amal allied in organizing a counter-demonstration to the anti-Syrian demonstrations – and in particular to the demonstrators’ call for the application of resolution 1559 (Patrie and Espanol 2006). This alliance was named the March 8 alliance (March 8). The counter-demonstration showed Hezbollah’s force and capacity to mobilize other parts of society that had been left out of Hariri’s economic prosperity and who had experienced the Israeli occupation of the South (Droz-Vincent 2007:30). The cycle of demonstrations culminated with the anti-Syrian demonstration on March 14, 2005 in which one million Lebanese called for ‘truth, freedom, and national unity’. The demonstration was especially important as it was the first time that the words Lebanon Awalen (‘Lebanon First’) were used by groups, who previously had worked for their own communal projects.

The events resulted in the withdrawal of Syrian troops on April 26, 2005. March 14 won a majority, 72 out of 128 seats, in the following May-June 2005 parliamentary elections (Droz-Vincent 2007:29). A national unity cabinet was formed, headed by Fouad Siniora, including also Hezbollah and Amal from the pro-Syrian camp. However, FPM, headed by Aoun, was excluded from the Cabinet although it participated in the anti-Syrian movement. This left a significant part of the Christian community with a feeling of non-representation. The FMP thus split from March 14. Moreover, disagreement over Lebanon’s place in the region, the international tribunal5, and the role of Hezbollah has resulted in immense conflict between the two blocs and lead to political crisis. The majority in the Cabinet is backed by the Unites States, Saudi Arabia, and France whereas the minority is backed by Syria and Iran. Moreover, Hezbollah has allied with FPM leader Aoun. The Cabinet became paralyzed due to the resignation of the

5 The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1664 on March 30, 2006; it calls for establishing an international tribunal to legally investigate the assassination of Rafic Hariri and other politically motivated assassinations committed from 2002 to 2006.
Shiite *Amal* and *Hezbollah* cabinet members November 11, 2007, and by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s subsequent decision not to convene Parliament on the rationale that the Cabinet is unconstitutional without Shiite representation (Patrie and Espanol 2006b:8). The political climate and security situation have deteriorated since then. Several politically motivated assassinations have taken place and Lebanon has entered its worst political crisis since the civil war.

### 2.4 The Electoral System

As I will demonstrate in this section, Lebanon has an open list system based on plurality voting in multi-member districts. It is a vote pooling system because electoral districts are mostly multi-confessional and all voters vote for all seats in an electoral district.

Andrew Reynolds, Benjamin Reilly, and Ellis Andrew (2005:169) classify Lebanon’s electoral system as a block vote system (BV). A BV uses plurality voting in multi-member districts. In BV “[v]oters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled in their district, and are usually free to vote for individual candidates regardless of party affiliation (Ibid:44).” Elections are held on the basis of several multi-member electoral districts. The voters in each electoral district have one vote for each seat in that electoral district. The seats in each district are allocated to specific confessional groups. For instance, in the Shouf electoral district (See Table 4) there are 3 Maronite seats, 1 Greek Catholic seat, 2 Sunni seats, and 2 Druze seats. Voters are presented with electoral lists that correspond to the predetermined confessional allocation.

Voters can vote for candidates from all confessional groups regardless of their own confession (Salem 2006). This is labelled a *vote pooling system*. Candidates from different confessions therefore form a list together that corresponds to the pre-set allocation. Except for the pre-set confessional ratio there are not other formal criteria for list formation. Incomplete lists are accepted. The example of the Tripoli electoral district can demonstrate the vote pooling system. Under vote pooling, the candidates of minority confessional groups in a specific electoral district are elected by voters who belong to the majority confessional groups (IFES 2005). In Tripoli, there are two
Christian seats and eight Muslim seats. The Muslim majority therefore elects the Christian candidates. The confessional allocation of seats differs from district to district. Most electoral districts are multi-confessional with either a Muslim or Christian majority. Others are uni-confessional (See Tables 3 and 4).

Yet, voters may subtract names from or add names to the list as long as the sectarian proportions of the lists are not altered, a practice dubbed *tashtib* (cross-out) (Salloukh 2006:640). It is thus an open list system as the candidates are elected from these lists separately to the seats allocated for each confessional group. Individual candidates thus win regardless of the other candidates' share of votes on the same list. If two lists compete against each other in one electoral district, the individual candidates with the highest share of votes win regardless of list affiliation, for example two candidates from list A and one candidate from list B.

The electoral formula employs plurality voting. Candidates are elected if they receive a plurality of the votes for the seats allocated to the confession they belong to (IFES 2005:9). In other words, in Tripoli, Maronite candidates compete for one seat, Creek Catholics compete for one seat, Sunnis compete for two seats, and Shiites compete for six seats. For instance, the top two Sunni candidates running for the two Sunni seats are elected. In Lebanon, plurality voting creates ‘winner-takes-it-all’ effects within each confession rather than among confessions since seats are allocated to predetermined confessional groups.

Post-war elections have violated the Ta’if Agreement. First, the agreement raised the number of parliamentary seats to 108 from the pre-war total of 99. Nine new Muslim seats were to be allocated to areas with clear Muslim demographic concentrations (Salloukh 2006:644). But later Law 154 of 1992 raised the number to 128 seats, adding 29 new seats to the pre-war total of 99. Second, when the Ta’if Agreement was negotiated, Lebanon was organized into six administrative regions (*mohafazat*) within which there were 26 districts (*aqdya*) (See Map). The Ta’if Agreement stipulated that the *mohafaza* should be the basis for elections after an administrative redrawing of the map. The constituencies were drawn on the basis of both the *mohafaza* and the *qada* (EU
EOM 2005:16). Where the *mobafaza* was the basis for the electoral constituency, the *qada* remained a unit within it.

Map of Lebanese Regions and Districts

![Map of Lebanese Regions and Districts](source)


The map shows the administrative units in Lebanon. The six larger regions (*mobafazat*) are shown in bold script: North, Mount Lebanon, Beirut, South, Nabatieh, and Beqaa. There are 26 smaller districts (*aqdya*). The administrative drawing has not changed after the Ta’if Agreement, although the definition of electoral districts has varied. (Note that on this map Beirut is both a region and a district).

Electoral districts were drawn on a mixed basis and subject to substantial gerrymandering in the post-war elections. Pro-Syrian post-war parliaments have gerrymandered electoral districts to serve the Syrian regime’s and its clients’ electoral
interests (Knudsen 2005:7–19). Changes to the electoral law were introduced at each election except the 2005 election. Changes to the electoral law require a two-thirds majority in the parliament. In 1992, elections were based on the Beirut, South, and North mohafaza, and on the qada in Mount Lebanon and the Beqa’ (EU EOM 2005:16). The 1996 elections introduced one amendment to the 1992 law. The three Beqa’ districts were rearranged into one large electoral district, neutralizing the Christian vote and weakening the Sunni vote (Atallah cited in Salloukh 2006:645–646). With one larger district the Shiite vote became more important as there is plurality voting (See Table 3). The 2000 electoral law introduced substantial amendments to the 1996 electoral districts (Salloukh 2006:645–647). The 2000 electoral law was named the ‘Ghazi Kanaan law’ after the former head of the Syrian intelligence service in Lebanon due to the particularly salient Syrian interference in the making of the law. Beirut was divided into three electoral districts, and in Mount Lebanon districts were reduced from six to four (Ibid). The aim was to contain Hariri in Beirut and Jumblatt in Mount Lebanon. The North and the South were divided into two electoral districts, neutralizing the Christian vote and strengthening the Shiite vote. The Beqa’ was re-divided into three districts as was the case in the 1992 electoral law. According to Salloukh (Ibid:647), the latter amendment had no specific impact due to Syria’s dominant role in the region anyway (See Table 3 of the 1992 and 1996 electoral districts and Table 4 of the ones in 2000 and 2005).

The electoral law has been criticized for insufficient regulation in a number of fields and for a range of other shortcomings (EU EOM 2005). The legal framework fails to meet the provisions of the UN International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. For instance, the ballot’s secrecy is not guaranteed, campaign financing is not regulated, and there is widespread vote buying (Ibid; Saad 2007).
Table 3: Electoral Districts and Sectarian Distribution in the 1992 and 1996 Parliamentary Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral District (Number of Districts)</th>
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<th>Greek Catholic</th>
<th>Armenian Orthodox</th>
<th>Armenian Catholic</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shiiite</th>
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Total Number of seats per sect 128

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*1996 elections were held on the basis of one large electoral district (mohafaza). The three electoral districts were rearranged into one.
Table 4: Electoral Districts and Sectarian Distribution in the 2000 Parliamentary Elections

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<td><strong>Total number of seats per sect</strong></td>
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Note: Districts set in italics were changed in the 1999 electoral law.
3 Assessing Accountability and Representativeness

In a representative democracy elected representatives take decisions that are implemented by appointed officials to whom the representatives delegate some responsibility (Manin et al. 1999:1). Representatives decide what citizens can and cannot do, and hence oblige citizens to comply with these decisions. The question of representation in all its aspects could take us into political and philosophical terrain well beyond this thesis’s scope. Nonetheless, an outline of the main theoretical considerations is relevant to the thesis. Critics of consociationalism hold that consociations increase agency problems as institutional mechanisms to hold agents accountable are lacking. Presumably, prospects for democratic government in consociations are poor.

This chapter outlines an analytical framework to assess accountability and representativeness. The chapter has two parts. The first part presents a general framework in order to assess and explain challenges to accountability and representativeness. This part defines and introduces concepts in the literature on representation and democratic government, discusses the alternative democratic ideals which constitute the bases for democracy models, and discusses the mechanisms to ensure accountability and representativeness. Institutional mechanisms to ensure accountability and representativeness are presented, followed by a discussion of challenges to the latter two. The second part presents a supplementary theoretical framework in order to assess the accountability and representativeness in consociations. It identifies specific challenges to accountability and representativeness in consociations.
3.1 Defining Accountability and Representativeness

Citizens delegate responsibility to representatives due to limits on their own capacity and competence (Strøm 2003). Delegation is “an act where one person or group, called a principal, relies on another person or group, called an agent, to act on the principal’s behalf” (Lupia 2003:35). Yet, delegation implies the risk of agency problems (Strøm et al. 2003). According to Strøm et al. (2003:23) there are two main challenges. First, principals may not be able to keep their agents ‘honest and diligent’ (moral hazard). Second, principals may not be able to choose the right agents in the first place (adverse selection). Agency problems may lead to agency loss. Agency loss can be defined as “the difference between the actual consequence of delegation and what the consequences would have been had the agent been perfect” (Lupia 2003:35). A perfect agent is a “hypothetical agent who does what the principal would have done if the principal had unlimited information and resources to do the job herself” (Ibid). Representativeness and accountability are important parameters of democratic governance because they serve to reduce agency loss.

The literature on accountability has been dominated by the responsible party government model (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007:1; White 2006). The model adopts a rationalistic perspective to explain democratic processes of representation in which agency theory is used as a conceptual framework to investigate delegation. Representation is thus conceived to be the result of the interaction between principals (voters or citizens) and agents (electoral candidates or elected officials). This interaction features five main elements (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007:1–2). First, voters have policy preferences that stem from interests and values. Second, politicians and parties that seek office structure policy positions into electoral platforms or programs, and promise to enact these if elected. Third, voters make a strategic choice between different programs. Fourth, victorious parties or party coalitions then carry out their programs and keep in touch with constituencies’ evolving preferences. Fifth, at the next election voters evaluate parties’ and officials’ performance, and decide whether to retain the incumbents. Voters thus hold the representatives accountable. The definition of accountability used here is as follows:
The agent (elected official/s) will be politically accountable when the principal (citizen/s) can hold him responsible for past performance and, therefore, reward him with reelection and punish him with defeat (Maravall 1999:155).

Another paramount aspect of democratic government is representativeness. For the purpose of this thesis, a distinction between descriptive and substantive representativeness is pertinent. Descriptive representation focuses on mirroring demographic characteristics, what Hannah Pitkin (1967) named ‘the representation of presence’. Substantive representation concerns mirroring opinions, what Anne Phillips (1995) called ‘representation of ideas’ (Randall 2006:392–393). Definitions of descriptive and substantive representativeness applied in this thesis are formulated as follows:

A body is descriptively representative if it mirrors voters’ demographic characteristics.

A body is substantively representative if it mirrors voters’ opinions.

Since Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government in 1861 it has been assumed that electing politicians mirroring the electorate’s demographic composition produces governments that also mirror voters’ opinions (Manin et al. 1999:32). In short, descriptive representation presumably ensures substantive representation. However, this is not necessarily given. For instance, government may mirror the demographic characteristics of the electorate, in terms of gender, age, regional belonging etc, but nonetheless, act contrary to voters’ opinions in certain policy areas. Thus, the government is descriptively representative, but not substantively so. The distinction between descriptive and substantive representativeness is therefore useful. In fact, both accountability and descriptive representativeness can be considered as mechanisms that ensure substantively representative governments.

3.2 Alternative Democratic Ideals

A much applied definition of democracy is “government by and for the people”, but as Lijphart (1991b:111) notes, it does not specify who should do the governing nor to whose interests the government should be responsive. Alternative democratic ideals
respond to this uncertainty. The majoritarian model favors concentrated power in the hands of the majority. The majoritarian definition of democracy is hence “government by the majority of the people” (Lijphart 1999:31). Ideally, the minority should act as an opposition in the parliament, and majorities and minorities should alternate in parliament according to the will of the people. In contrast, the consensus democracy model establishes an alternative democratic ideal. The consensus model favors dispersed or shared power (Lijphart 1991b, Powell 2000). The consensus definition of democracy is hence “government by as many people as possible” (Lijphart 1991b:112). The consensus model argues that the preferences of all citizens, not just the majority’s, should be taken into consideration. Emphasis is put on bringing representatives from all factions of society into policy coalitions. Proponents of the consensus model assert that the majoritarian model presupposes a homogenous majority. If on the contrary, the population is heterogeneous, majoritarian democracy may exclude certain groups. Minority exclusion, however, is mitigated if majorities and minorities actually alternate in parliament, but not if the minority is “condemned to permanent opposition” (Lijphart 1999:32). Minority exclusion is especially dangerous in heterogeneous or plural societies in which loyalties are rigid, and majorities and minorities are less likely to alternate.

In the preceding discussion, it was established that both accountability and representativeness constitute essential democratic parameters. Yet, they are accentuated to varying degrees by the majoritarian and consensus models of democracy. The majoritarian model is more concerned about delegation risks and agency problems than the consensus model is. The consensus model, on the contrary, is more concerned with the exclusion and non-representation of minorities. Thus majoritarian democracy tends to stress accountability over descriptive representativeness in order to achieve substantively representative government and consensus democracy vice versa. In the following discussion, the terms majoritarian democracy and majoritarianism on the one hand, and consensus democracy and proportionalism, on the other, will be used interchangeably.
3.3 Institutional Mechanisms to Ensure Accountability and Representativeness

In the following I will present three mechanisms that ensure accountability and representativeness: parliamentary opposition, elections, and political parties.

3.3.1 Parliamentary Opposition

The Cabinet may be accountable directly to the citizens or indirectly through parliament (Laver and Shepsle 1999:279). Parliament is meant to monitor and control the collective cabinet as well as individual cabinet members. In this regard, parliamentary opposition constitutes an essential mechanism to ensure accountability by providing ‘checks and balances’. This mechanism is called horizontal accountability in the following chapters.

3.3.2 Elections

Both the majoritarian and the consensus models consider elections as the fundamental mechanism to link citizens to policy makers (Powell 2000). However, they disagree on how elections serve to link citizens to policy makers. One difference between majoritarian and consensus democracy concerns whether elections serve to link citizens to policy makers primarily by means of control or influence (Powell 2000:5). Proponents of majoritarianism favor accountability over representativeness, and regard elections primarily as a means to control policy makers through the threat of being removed from office. Proponents of proportionalism favor representativeness over accountability, and regard elections primarily as a means to influence policy making. In the former, citizens use elections to choose among policy makers or to reward or punish the incumbents. In the latter, citizens use elections to choose representative agents who should bargain over the most preferable policies to their constituents.

Two dimensions characterize citizen choice (Powell 2000:7–10). First, the vertical dimension of citizen choice concerns the target of voting. A citizen’s target in majoritarianism is the collective government. The government bears responsibility for policy making as a collective body – its members are not individually responsible. In contrast,
proportionalism considers the target of voting to be the representative agent. The representative agent can be a person, or a political party that will try to serve its constituents in negotiations or in coalitions.

Second, the horizontal dimension of citizen choice refers to voter’s time perspective (Powell 2000:9). Retrospective voting involves looking backwards, voting on the basis of evaluating the performance of the government or the representative. Prospective voting involves looking ahead, voting on the basis of an evaluation of which government or representative will best attend to the voter’s interests. Thus, retrospective voting entails using elections as a sanctioning device because they might induce elected officials to keep their promises to stay in office (Fearon 1999). Then again, prospective voting can be conceived of as a selection device because it allows citizens to choose governments or representative agents who presumably will act in the citizens’ interests. Nonetheless, Fearon (Ibid:83) claims that the mechanisms of selection and sanctioning will interact because voters, when choosing future representatives, will choose on the basis of evaluating representatives’ past performances as well.

According to Powell (2000:8) the two dimensions of citizen choice can be combined to form four modes of citizen control by the way elections link citizens to policy makers. Hence, the four types derived are accountability, electoral mandates, representative trustee, and representative delegate (See Figure 1). The former two correspond to a majoritarian vision of democracy that considers accountability primary. The latter two correspond to a proportional vision of democracy in which representativeness is the fundamental consideration. Accountability and representativeness will therefore be ensured to varying degrees in the four types.

In the first mode, elections ensure accountability because of the possibility to ‘throw the rascals out’ (Powell 2000). Citizens hold the collective government responsible for its past performance. In the electoral mandates mode, citizens focus not on the incumbent government, but rather on the opposition and policy alternatives in order to choose a prospective new government. In the latter two modes, elections are not decisive for policy making. The voter rather assumes that bargaining takes place on policy issues. In the representative trustees mode, citizens evaluate representative agents’
performance in retrospect. This mode is less applied (Powell 2000), and will not be used in the analysis. In the representative delegates mode, the voter chooses an agent or a delegate (candidate or party) to bargain on her behalf in policy making. The representative agent is thus given an *authorized representation* in policy making.

Figure 1: Four modes of citizen control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voter’s Time Perspective</th>
<th>Retrospective</th>
<th>Prospective</th>
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<tr>
<td>Collective Government</td>
<td>Government Accountability</td>
<td>Government Mandates</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Representative Trustee)</td>
<td>Authorized Representation</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: Based on Powell (2000)

Different electoral systems are designed in order to respond to the ideals of majoritarian and consensus democracy. A majoritarian electoral system is better designed to ensure accountability, whereas a proportional electoral system is better designed to ensure descriptive representation. A majoritarian electoral system ensures accountability because it is better at carrying voter majorities into majority cabinets that are able to convert promises into outcomes. Voters can therefore hold cabinets responsible for outcomes (Powell 2000). A proportional electoral system better ensures descriptive representativeness because it better generates policymaking coalitions in which more cabinet members can be influential. In addition, an election system’s electoral attributes, such as district magnitude and constituency structure can be designed to produce more
or less descriptively representative election results (Lijphart 1999; Blanc et al. 2006). Such attributes are discussed in section 3.5.1.

3.3.3 Political Parties

“Elections must be helped by other organizations and by rules that encourage communication and cooperation” (Powell 2000:4). In the absence of an organizational and regulatory framework, citizens would not be able to use elections as means to ensure accountability or representativeness. Political parties are paramount to link citizens and policy makers, as well as individual candidates and collective policy commitments. Huckshorn (cited in White 2006:5) gives a pragmatic definition of a political party as “an autonomous group of citizens having the purpose of making nominations and contesting elections in hope of gaining control over governmental power through the capture of public offices and the organization of the government”. Aldrich’s (cited in Ibid:6) definition also includes an organizational aspect “[…] a political party is an institutionalized coalition, one that has adopted rules, norms, and procedures.”

Political parties may play a particularly crucial role in the consolidation of democracy (Catón 2007). According to Schmitter (2001) political parties have four important functions. First, they should structure the electoral process through nominating candidates, and thus provide citizens with a choice between alternative sets of leaders. Second, they should provide citizens with a stable and distinctive set of ideas and goals and orient them toward policy options. Third, they should be capable of forming a cabinet and making policy. Fourth, they should aggregate a significant proportion of the citizenry’s interests. Thus, political parties are important to ensure accountability in both majoritarian and proportional models. In majoritarian models political parties are important because they provide institutional structures to hold a collective government accountable (Katz 2006:35). For instance, political parties run in elections on political programs. At the next elections, voters will evaluate the fulfillment of these programs. In proportional models voters give representative agents (political parties) ‘authorized representation’ to bargain on their behalf in negotiations and
coalition building. Political parties can create more effective agents that are more likely to influence policy making.

Moreover, the party system influences prospects of accountability and representativeness. On one hand, the majoritarian model views a two-party system as an essential requirement for achieving accountability “in which the opposition party acts as the critic of the party in power, developing, defining and presenting the policy alternatives which are necessary for a true choice in reaching public decisions” (White 2006:10). On the other hand, the consensus democracy model favors multiparty systems because such systems are able to include more citizen preferences (Lijphart 1999:87). In homogenous societies with few cleavages, a small number of parties (or a two-party system) may be sufficient to aggregate voters’ interests and values. Yet, in heterogeneous societies with several segments or groups, a two-party system will create unrepresentative government that fails to mirror the electorate.

Political parties’ internal structure influences accountability and representativeness. Internal party democracy can contribute to holding party leaders accountable (Katz 2006:36). Because political parties have adopted “rules, norms, and procedures” as Aldrich noted, there are procedures for decision making and policy making. In the same way that governments or representative agents are subject to elections, so are party leaders internally. Without internal party democracy, the link that political parties provide between policymakers and citizens may be broken, thus hindering accountability. Maravall (1999:165) asserts that parties may impede accountability if “their leaders use them in order to manipulate information and prevent monitoring”. In contrast he asserts that democratic political parties may “be important instruments of accountability”.

In addition, internal party democracy may enhance representativeness indirectly. By allowing for greater participation by ordinary party members, a greater number of citizens influence policy making (Katz 2006:35).
3.4 Challenges to Accountability

Proponents of majoritarianism are more concerned about agency problems than proponents of proportionalism are (Powell 2000:7). The main criticism concerning accountability therefore comes from the majoritarian school. Manin et al. (1999:38) argue that information asymmetries in the principal-agent relationship create moral hazard as agents might try to benefit from this relationship. This would still not be a problem if accountability were guaranteed, but politicians are not legally compelled to abide by their platform in any democratic system. Manin et al. (Ibid:17) further remark that agents determine how much principals will know of agents’ actions. Information asymmetry may enable agents to withhold information, give incorrect information, or blur their responsibility (Ferejohn 1999). Politicians may also manipulate citizens’ preferences and thus obtain a margin of autonomy for their policies, so-called “leadership effect” (Jacobs and Shapiro cited in Maravall 1999:157). Hence, information asymmetry can lead to moral hazard and may therefore undermine accountability (Müller et al. 2003; Manin et al. 1999; Powell 2000).

However, challenges to accountability vary according to the type of political design, mainly majoritarian or proportional. One aspect of the information asymmetry problem is citizens’ ability to place responsibility on the agents (Powell 2000:11, 92; Manin et al. 1999:47). Clarity of responsibility is a fundamental condition for holding agents accountable for their performance. As Powell (2000) has pointed out, the target of accountability differs within majoritarianism and proportionalism. Placing responsibility is more difficult in an authorized representation mode because the representative agent will be one part out of several in a coalition or a negotiation. Citizens may not know how their representative agents acted within these coalitions or negotiations. In contrast, in a strict majoritarian regime, the collective government is held responsible. Elections determine whether the incumbent government should stay or leave. Moreover, it is a precondition for placing responsibility that ‘the real movers’ be identified (Burke cited in Dunn 1999). In countries that have especially numerous and strong external relations, ‘the real movers’ are sometimes hard to identify.
Elections presumably work as an institutional mechanism to ensure accountability by constituting a threat to politicians who want to get reelected. However, sometimes candidates do not seek reelection (Manin et al. 1999). They may wish to stay in office one period only, reaping the benefits, and leave office before the next period. Moreover, in some cases there are term limits, and officials may not have the possibility to run again anyway. Elections – as a mechanism to control elected representatives through the threat of being removed from office – may only ensure prospective voting. This scenario may be especially valid for presidential candidates. Hence such cases challenge accountability.

In a recent study, Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) identify another type of principal-agent relationship that challenges the traditional ways of thinking about accountability. Their study depicts a voter-politician linkage based on patronage. In many political systems, particularly in new democracies which are of prime concern to this thesis, direct material inducements to individuals or groups are exchanged for votes. *Clientelistic accountability* represents “a transaction, the direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services” (Ibid:4). All politicians in democracies target benefits to particular voter groups but in clientelistic systems the provision of services is contingent upon voters’ electoral support (Ibid:10). Voters’ electoral support is monitored. Furthermore, electoral competition strengthens the client’s (principal’s) bargaining leverage vis-à-vis patrons (agents). Thus in clientelistic societies in which democratic institutions have been introduced, local clientelistic networks may turn into national, hierarchical ones through competitive elections.

In the preceding discussion, challenges to accountability have been analyzed through the lens of agency theory which conceives electoral behavior as rational and linkages as strategic. However, as Fearon (1999:57–58) notes, there are, indeed, “elections with no expectation of accountability”, thus challenging the rational view that elections are part of an agency relationship. For instance, voters may conceive elections as conferring honor on the best or most distinguished person, hence voting according to whom presumably deserves the honor of political authority. In many Middle Eastern countries, Lebanon included, honor is a significant determinant in politics. In a similar mode, other non-strategic linkages, such as political leadership based on traditional or
charismatic leadership, naturally constitute different forms of voter-politician linkages not always bound by rationality.

3.5 Challenges to Representativeness

3.5.1 Challenges to Descriptive Representativeness

A fair electoral system should create a representative assembly (Blanc et al. 2006:39). As noted earlier, electoral system designs and special electoral attributes constitute the main institutional mechanisms to ensure descriptive representativeness. Majoritarianism and proportionalism constitute the main theoretical approaches to the study of electoral systems. The main types of electoral formulae are plurality, majority, and proportionality. There are several ‘sub systems’ to these systems; this thesis’s scope does not allow for a specific discussion of these, but I will outline general advantages and disadvantages.

Proportional representation designs achieve more representative election results (e.g. Lijphart 1991c; O’Leary 2003). Proponents of majoritarian democracy advocate plurality or majority electoral formulae. Such electoral formulae may create unrepresentative legislatures because of winner-takes-it-all effects. The candidate supported by most voters wins, and all the other voters remain unrepresented. On a national basis voter majorities will tend to be overrepresented in majoritarian systems (Lijphart 1999:143). In contrast, proportional electoral systems (PR) aim to reflect or translate votes proportionally, seeking neither to overrepresent majorities nor underrepresent minorities.

An important electoral attribute is district magnitude. “The magnitude of an electoral district denotes the number of candidates to be elected in the district, and has a strong effect on the degree of disproportionality and the number of parties” (Lijphart 1999:150). Within plurality and majority systems, increasing the district magnitude entails greater disproportionality and advantages for larger parties, whereas under PR it results in greater proportionality and better conditions for small parties. Blanc et al. (2006:48) hold that plurality voting in single-member districts has a negative impact on
representativeness because it hinders small parties from representation. If a party’s support is evenly distributed across constituencies, the largest party will benefit, whereas small- and medium-sized parties with similar support patterns will have difficulties in being represented. Except for parties with strong regional support, it can be hard for new parties to enter the political system. Hence, constituency structure partly determines the proportionality of the election results, especially if support varies regionally (Ibid:50). Gerrymandering – the redrawing of electoral district boundaries for electoral gain – constitutes an issue in many countries. It is a particularly strong temptation in single-member districts, but becomes more difficult with increasing district magnitude (Lijphart 1999:193)

Some features that do not relate to the electoral system per se may also influence representativeness. First, defining the demos – or deciding who shall have the right to vote (Blanc et al. 2006) – has consequences for the legislature’s representativeness. Certain restrictions on the demos, such as concerning minimum voting age, are widely accepted. Nonetheless, restrictions on citizenship or residence etc. may pose greater controversies, especially in plural societies. Second, the prohibition of certain political parties with a significant voter basis may cause unrepresentative government. Third, electoral participation is crucial to the genuine representativeness of the electorate and the legitimacy of electoral results. Hence, parameters such as electoral turn-out and boycotts are vital to assess descriptive representativeness.

3.5.2 Challenges to Substantive Representativeness

Low accountability undermines substantive representativeness. Shortcomings in descriptive representativeness may also undermine substantive representativeness, although this relationship is less clear.

The adverse selection problem challenges substantive representativeness in particular (Müller et al. 2003:24). Adverse selection entails cases in which voters may fail to choose agents that have the same policy preferences as they do. Adverse selection has several causes. First, voters may not have sufficient or accurate information about the candidates. Second, the electorate, or parts of it, may vote on the basis of patronage
instead of choosing agents with the same political policy preferences. In conflict areas, the electorate may vote on the basis of who can provide patronage in terms of security. Third, voters can be motivated by other than strategic interests as pointed out earlier, for instance by honor, patriarchy or charismatic leadership. Last, the choice presented to the voters may be short of candidates with opinions and preferences coinciding with those of the voters. Hence, several conditions may affect the adverse selection problem such as insufficient electoral campaigns, poor socio-economic situation, an unstable security situation, and cultural patterns.

The type of party system and the recruitment processes of electoral candidates influence voters’ political options. First, scholars argue that a multi-party system correlates positively with greater proportionality and aggregation of voter interests (Lijphart 1999:87–88). A high number of political parties most likely aggregates more voter preferences than a low number, and hence reduces the potential of agency loss caused by adverse selection. The desirable number of parties depends on the cleavages that exist in a given society. Second, the recruitment process is important for determining the type of candidates that run in elections, and whether they are representative of the electorate. For instance, insofar as new candidates’ access to the electoral arena is hindered by elitist, hereditary, or patriarchic recruitment patterns, the electorate’s opinions may not correspond to those of electoral candidates.

3.6 Accountability and Representativeness in Consociations

The institutional structure of consociations poses specific challenges and prospects for accountability and representativeness in addition to the general challenges discussed in the preceding sections. The following sections discuss the challenges to accountability and representativeness in consociations. Consociational challenges to accountability are discussed first and to representativeness thereafter.
3.6.1 Consociational Challenges to Accountability

Segmental elites play a particular and crucial role in consociations (Parry 2005:7). Lijphart (1977) argues that elites need extensive autonomy to make inter-communal elite compromise and consociation is therefore contingent upon a *politics of accommodation*. This involves secrecy in decision making and bargaining. According to Daalder (1974:608), “[s]uch politics inevitably reduce the importance of elections and even of the direct accountability of leaders.” Such politics emanate within a consociation from the institutional decision-making structure through a grand coalition. Lustick (1997:104) asserts that Decision making within consociations includes practices of exclusion and control.

As we have seen, this institutional structure challenges accountability as it increases information asymmetries between agents and principals. Information asymmetries increase within consociations due to two aspects resulting from the institutional structure of a grand cabinet. First, a cabinet representative of all significant segments tends to be over-sized, including most groups represented in parliament. Thus with regard to such an institutional structure of cabinet, the mode of citizen control corresponds to an authorized representation mode (See 2.3.1). A conclusion from the discussion of the different modes of citizen control was that accountability in authorized representation regimes primarily entails the selection of representative agents (Powell 2000).

The inherent principal-agent information asymmetry within consociations is problematic. Placing responsibility for outcomes or policies executed by grand coalitions can be difficult. Options for ‘rent-seeking’ politicians therefore increase as elites have greater opportunities to withhold information from voters or manipulate it. So-called ‘leadership effects’ therefore constitute a greater threat within consociations. In plural societies in particular, elites may benefit from playing on sectarianism and communal fear in order to sustain their elite status.

Second, information asymmetries between agents and principals within consociations increase because of the absence of parliamentary opposition in
consociations (Barry 1975, van Schendelen 1984, Lustick 1997, Brass 1991). Inclusion in the cabinet of most groups represented in parliament reduces opposition. The prospects for opposition within consociations depend on the cabinet’s inclusiveness (O’Leary 2005:17). The less inclusive the cabinet, the more opposition there will be in the parliament. Brass therefore (1991:338) opines that the “democratic benefits that can accrue from ‘tossing the rascals out’ are unavailable, and do not give powerful parliamentary players incentives to keep government honest by shining light in dark corners”. Thus, the inherent lack of horizontal accountability in consociations enhances risks for moral hazard.

Critics of consociationalism further claim that power-sharing agreements create monopolies for the parties to the agreements (Roeder and Rotchild 2005:331). O’Leary (2005:11) holds on the contrary that nothing precludes electoral competition. Critics of consociationalism assert, moreover, that links to foreign actors, especially by financial ties, may help maintain elite monopolies (Zahar 2005). Naturally, this applies not only to consociations. However, many accounts hold that consociations are more vulnerable to foreign interference, for instance because elites may ally with foreign actors or states to increase their domestic power.

3.6.2 Consociational Challenges to Representativeness

This sections first looks at consociational challenges to descriptive representativeness. Then, it looks at challenges to substantive representativeness.

**Descriptive Representativeness**

Descriptive representativeness is of particular concern in consociations as segmental representation in political institutions presumably manages and moderates sectarian conflict and protects minorities. Consociationalism encourages proportional electoral system designs (e.g. Lijphart 2004). Yet, most power-sharing regimes in plural societies seek to achieve proportionality through non-proportional electoral designs (Reilly 2005).
Predetermining seats for certain groups can also achieve segmental proportionality although it is more difficult to engineer.

Such *predetermination* in the distribution of seats may produce negative effects on representativeness (O’Leary 2003, 2005; Lijphart 1991a). Predetermination can be distinguished from self-determination\(^6\). Lijphart (Ibid:66) defines self-determination as “a method or process that gives various rights to groups within the existing state – for instance, autonomy rather than sovereignty – and it allows these groups to manifest themselves instead of deciding in advance on the identity of the groups.” On the other hand, predetermination is “an internal process […] and means that the groups that are to share power are identified in advance” (Ibid). Predetermination may undermine descriptive representativeness in at least two ways. First, predetermination may challenge descriptive representativeness because the system fixes the relative shares of representation and other privileges for the segments on a permanent or semi-permanent basis (1991a:73). Thus the system will be unable to adapt to changes in demographics and the result will be descriptively unrepresentative bodies. Brass (1991:342) asserts that consociations “violate the rights of those groups in being and those that may develop in the future whose existence is not recognized by the state.” In contrast, with self-determination, the share and type of segments will adapt to possible demographic changes.

Second, predetermination often tends to overrepresent minorities. On one hand, overrepresentation is a method to protect minorities, and is therefore often demanded by them (O’Leary 2003:725). On the other hand, overrepresentation of minorities and mutual veto rights – a consociational prescription – are problematic to majorities, and deviate from the principle of representativeness. Majorities may accept veto rights but not overrepresentation.

\(^6\) Lijphart’s terminology is used in addressing these issues as it is more well-known. O’Leary (2003) refers to predetermined as *corporate* and self-determined as *liberal*. 
The representativeness of the legislature influences the composition of the executive. Nonetheless, there is no automatic link between the composition of the legislature and formation of government. On one hand, it may seem as if proportional system designs also better produce representative executives or ‘grand coalitions’ (O’Leary 2003). On the other hand, Reilly (2005) states that empirical findings contradict consociational arguments. Reilly investigates the relationship between electoral PR systems and the executive’s representativeness. According to Reilly (2005), voluntary agreements by parties determine cabinet representativeness more than electoral systems do.

In order to assess the executive power’s representativeness in consociations, O’Leary (2003, 2005) distinguishes between democratic consociations which can be complete, concurrent, or weak on one hand, and between undemocratic consociations on the other hand. In a complete consociation “the political leaders of all significant segments of an ethnically differentiated territory are represented” (O’Leary 2003:700). Thus, if there are two segments, for instance Muslims (M) and Christians (C), and their voters split their support between two political parties respectively (M1, M2, C1, C2), and all of these groups are represented, the consociation is complete. In a concurrent consociation each significant segment is represented (M, C), and has at least majority support from each such significant segment (M1 and C1 are supported by a majority; M2 and C2 are not represented). In a weak consociation, each significant segment has elected political leaders who have at least plurality support amongst their voters (M1 and M2 are supported by a plurality) (Ibid:702). If one or more segments give its plurality assent while other segments give majority or higher levels of support, it counts as a weak consociation (for instance, M1 is supported by a majority, M2 by a plurality). Within a weak consociation the non-representation of certain groups within segments, and low support by represented groups, may undermine both descriptive and substantive representativeness.

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7 Reilly (2005) uses inclusiveness of the executive instead of representativeness. I will use my own terminology for reasons of specificity.
as the groups within segments may reflect either demographic characteristics or mirror voters’ opinions.

In contrast, undemocratic consociations lack the representation and participation of “one or more demographically, electorally and politically significant” segment (O’Leary 2003:704). In such a consociation, a dominant coalition may either exclude another significant segment (exclusion), or a whole segment or a majority of a segment may refuse to participate even though they are offered places (voluntary self-exclusion). This undermines descriptive representation.

**Substantive Representativeness**

The sectarian distribution of seats within consociations can undermine substantive representativeness because it stresses the representation of sectarian interests over other interests (Horowitz 1985). Critics of consociationalism contend that sectarian distribution impedes the aggregation of socio-economic and national interests. Ghai (2002:153) argues against sectarian representation because it makes it hard to establish national parties, and because sectarian identity gains prevalence over class. Although consociationalists recognize that such sectarian distribution of seats tends to follow this pattern, they argue that sectarian cleavages are the most salient cleavages in plural societies (e.g. Lijphart 1997). However, although consociations favor sectarian parties, the contention that they do not aggregate class interests should be modified. Richani (1998) notes that sectarian cleavages often overlap with class divisions. Thus establishing national parties is difficult because cleavages are overlapping and not crosscutting.

Moreover, sectarian distribution of seats on the basis of predetermination is problematic for substantive representativeness as it assigns individuals to specific segmental groups. Individuals may object to such labeling, for instance, if citizens consider themselves secular but are officially registered as part of a religious group (Lijphart 1991a:72). Such systems may therefore pre-empt people’s identities and preferences (O’Leary 2003:724). It also means that there is no place for individuals or groups that reject the premise of a society defined on a communal basis (Lijphart
Self-determination, in contrast, avoids the issue of who should be represented because the segments identify themselves (Lijphart 1991a:71).

Critics of consociationalism assert that sectarian distribution of seats favors the emergence of sectarian and non-moderate politicians; they therefore suggest a vote pooling system. This approach is labeled *moderation-focused incentivism* or *centripetalism*. Vote pooling arrangements are described as follows by Dahl, Shapiro, and Cheibub (2003:152):

> The exchange of votes by ethnically-based parties that, because of the electoral system, are marginally dependent for victory on the votes of groups other than their own and that, to secure those votes, must behave moderately on the issues in conflict. The electoral rewards provided to a moderate middle compensate for the threat posed by opposition from those who can benefit from the aversion of some group members to interethnic compromise.

Vote pooling is expected to promote “pre-electoral coalitions, coalitions that need to compromise in order to attract votes across group lines but that may be opposed by ethnic parties on the flanks” (Dahl et al. 2003:152). However, Salloukh (2006) claims that vote pooling and inter-sectarian alliances restrict citizens’ electoral and political choices. In fact, certain traits of the electoral alliances may increase the risks for moral hazard because they contain incentives for sectarian leaders to manipulate the elections for their own private gains (Ibid:639). Salloukh (2006) argues that such electoral alliances undermine both accountability and representation and they are therefore ultimately problematic for substantive representativeness.

The adverse selection problem is especially relevant to consociations because segmental elites play vital roles. Elitist theory is specifically critical toward the role of societal elites because their position may enable them to control elections and leave the great majority of the people little effective choice over candidates (Parry 2005). Brass (1991:338) lamented that consociationalism permits “the same combination of elites to entrench themselves at the peaks of spoils and patronage hierarchies more or less continually.” According to Salloukh (2006), vote pooling and pre-electoral alliances decrease competition and thus the choice over electoral candidates.
Table 5: Specification of Institutions and Mechanisms Designed to Ensure Accountability and Representativeness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Specification of Mechanism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accountability</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION</td>
<td>• Monitor the Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ELECTIONS</td>
<td>• Sanction incumbents (Government accountability mode)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Select alternatives (Government mandates mode)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Select representative agents to bargain (authorized representation mode)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. POLITICAL PARTIES</td>
<td>• Provide political choices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Form cabinets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representativeness</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. GRAND COALITION</td>
<td>• Represent all significant segments in the executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ELECTIONS</td>
<td>• Achieve proportionality through PR designs or non-PR method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. POLITICAL PARTIES</td>
<td>• Nominate electoral candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Aggregate voters’ interests</td>
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4 The Grand Coalition

Different approaches in democratic theory consider the grand coalition to be either a panacea or an Achilles’ heel for democratic government. Consociationalism considers it the prime tool to ensure representation of various segments in the executive power (e.g. Lijphart 1977). Critics of consociationalism contend on the contrary that grand coalitions thwart democracy (e.g. Roeder and Rotchild 2005; Jarstad 2006a). In Lebanon, executive power before the Ta’if Agreement was concentrated in the Maronite Presidency and the Sunni Premiership (Ziadeh 2006:140–143). With the Ta’if Agreement (1989), the institutional arrangement called the *Troika* emerged as the real decision maker (Haddad 2002:213). In addition, the Cabinet was strengthened relative to the President. The Cabinet decides on routine matters whereas the *Troika* handles the more contentious issues, like foreign policy. In order to assess the executive’s accountability and representativeness in consociations during the post-war period, it is pertinent to examine the *Troika* and the Cabinet. This chapter shows that grand coalitions weaken accountability because horizontal accountability is undermined, and shows that the mutual veto leads to fractionalized decision making. Moreover, the chapter shows that grand coalitions do not necessarily lead to high representativeness.

The chapter is divided in two main parts which assess accountability and representativeness respectively. The chapter starts by analyzing the consociational system’s influence on horizontal accountability and opposition, then analyzes how foreign interference and ties undermine domestic accountability on the whole. Then the post-war executive is analyzed concerning representativeness. Finally, particular flaws in substantive representativeness are discussed.
4.1 Prospects for Accountability

4.1.1 Limited Parliamentary Monitoring

Scholars of majoritarian democracy argue, as we have seen, that an opposition is fundamental to the checks and balances between the legislative and executive branches (See section 3.3.1). This section therefore analyzes prospects of horizontal accountability.

In Lebanon, national unity cabinets have been formed after 1990; they included at least six main confessional communities and various political groups (Gebara 2007:16). The cabinets were very large, encompassing around thirty members. Oversized cabinets leave little room for parliamentary opposition. If nearly all political groups represented in parliament also are included in the Cabinet, no clear alternative exists to the incumbents. Critics thus claim that the “democratic benefits that can accrue from ‘tossing the rascals out’ are unavailable, and do not give powerful parliamentary players incentives to keep government honest by shining light in dark corners” (Brass 1991:338). Oversized cabinets create weak opposition. Salem (2007 [Interview]) remarks that “the parliament doesn’t really hold the government accountable. They are like a team. The deputies from a bloc support their part in government no matter what.” This damages Parliament’s monitoring role and thus undermines horizontal accountability. For example, the Lebanese parliament has never had a no-confidence vote against any cabinet or cabinet member, and few cases concern the condemnation of a cabinet member (Krayem [10.04.08]; Salhab 2003:90–91). However, the principle of non-confidence votes contradicts the essence of a consensus-based political system.

A number of Lebanese particularities, moreover, reduce the prospects for horizontal accountability. First, there is no restriction on holding positions in the Parliament and in the Cabinet at the same time. In other words, “politics plays judge and jury at the same time” (Salloukh 2007 [Interview]). Second, cabinet members are often recruited from Parliament. Consequently, aspiration for cabinet office induces a sort of patron-client relationship between the Cabinet and Parliament (Harik 1975). Also, the
lack of a legal rational bureaucracy reinforces this relationship as the allocation of resources to confessional communities or regions is based on personal and clientelistic ties. It is common practice that the deputies lobby the Cabinet for resources to their electoral districts. Farid Al-Khazen (2007 [Interview]), a deputy affiliated with the FPM, said that deputies need to lobby and put pressure on the Cabinet continuously because of corruption and favoritism in the Cabinet, and because of the lack of a social security system guaranteeing a minimum of benefits and services to people. Parliament’s monitoring role is therefore significantly weakened. Salam (cited in Salhab 2003:91) depicts a reversed relationship between the executive and legislative in Lebanon:

Instead of controlling the executive, the deputies need most often to be at the service of the executive in order to achieve certain favors, in particular, electoral victory in the next elections due to the support of the executive. Hence, the roles are reversed. It is the executive who controls, to a large extent, the legislative instead of being controlled by it.

Blurry lines between the legislative and executive thus create poor prospects for accountability. However, opposition is moved from the parliamentary arena to other arenas. Majorities and minorities in parliament are not allowed to exist under consociationalism as most groups are included in the executive. In majoritarian democracy, executive power is assumed to shift between Cabinet alternatives whereas in consociations the Cabinet includes several alternatives at the same time. Consociationalism moves opposition from the parliament to the grand coalition and the Cabinet. Consequently, opposition in post-war Lebanon has been exercised within the Troika and by cabinet members (Al-Khazen 2003:613).

4.1.2 Opposition and Mutual Veto in the Troika and Cabinet

The institutional structure of the Troika allows for the three presidents to veto each other’s decisions informally. Hudson (1988:227) recognizes that the distribution of high offices among the sects operates as a mutual veto in a “practical if not strictly legal way”. The constitution, however, enshrines formal veto power via a two-thirds vote by cabinet members on fundamental issues (Ta’if Agreement found in Ziadeh (2006), Appendix
Fundamental issues are: states of emergency and their abolition, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the state's general budget, comprehensive and long term development plans, the appointment of top-level civil servants or their equivalents, reexamination of the administrative division, dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, the election law, the citizenship law, the personal status laws, and the dismissal of cabinet members. In addition, the President issues the decree forming the Council of Ministers (Ibid:Article 1.2) and thus he may de facto obstruct or veto a cabinet.

The *Troika* can be said to have led to rigidity and fragmented decision making. Gebara (2006:7; 2007:17) asserts that the *Troika* divided the state apparatus among themselves and that each became the major decision maker for his designated share. Thus in 1992 Prime Minister Hariri became the sole decision maker for economic and reconstruction matters, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri for relief and reconstruction matters in the South, and President Elias Hrawi for oil and gas sector matters. The practice of the Prime Minister’s being in charge of the economy has been consolidated since 1992. Moreover, Berri, alongside *Hezbollah*, is still primarily responsible for the South. According to El-Ezzi (2003:16), when the *Troika* unites, it is primarily to defend their own personal, partisan interests respectively, instead of national ones. In the post-war period, in cases of mounting disagreement and conflict between the three presidents, a top-down decision was made by the Syrian regime (Ibid). Power struggles, that sometimes have resulted in inability to take decisions and execute policies, have characterized the post-war period. In the absence of ‘an external power’ after the 2005 Syrian withdrawal, disputes and political crises have increased. My interviews with Lebanese decision makers suggest that although internal Lebanese decision making became more autonomous after the Syrian withdrawal, the power struggle among the *Troika* and within the Cabinet has in fact resulted in less decision making.

The troubles surrounding the establishment of the International Tribunal demonstrate the negative effects caused by the mutual veto enabled by the institutional structure of the *Troika*. The International Tribunal were to try suspects in the assassination of Hariri and in the politically motivated assassinations of others from 2004 to 2006 (Patrie and Espanol 2007b:8). Former President Emile Lahoud – installed
by the Syrian regime in November 1998, and whose mandate was extended in 2004 in violation of the Constitution – refused to ratify the reforms proposed by the Cabinet. Hence the International Tribunal’s establishment was made very difficult (Ibid). President Lahoud was boycotted by the main parts of the international community who considered his tenure unconstitutional. Although the boycott reduced his power, Lahoud managed to play a certain political role by refusing to ratify cabinet decrees.

Consociational cabinets correspond to the authorized representation mode presented in section 3.3.2, because cabinet members are expected to bargain for their voters’ interests. The data suggests that cabinet members experience a double role that can undermine national coherent decision making and raise the level of conflict in the cabinet. On one hand, a cabinet member is part of a collective body that should execute national policies. In particular, a cabinet member is responsible for a specific post, for instance health or administrative planning. On the other hand, a cabinet member is elected on a sectarian quota and is thus expected to serve his community. The interview data shows that cabinet members perceive their role as a political, technocrat, and communitarian one. Haddad (2002:210) asserts that cabinet members in Lebanon mainly represent their sects. Tension exists as national interests sometimes contradict communal ones. Yet, tension appears more often in some cabinet posts, like in the service ministries.

That cabinet members have double roles increases conflict. One example of an informal use of veto in the post-war period concerns the resignation of the six Amal and Hezbollah cabinet members on November 11, 2006 (Favier 2006:15). The formation of the 2005 national unity cabinet was based on an agreement between March 14 and March 8 that Hezbollah would take part in the government on the condition that it be protected against, amongst others, US efforts to classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and to disarm its military wing. In return, March 14 would reelect Nabih Berri as Parliament Speaker. The cabinet majority (March 14), however, refused by majority vote to postpone the composition of the International Tribunal’s Inquiry Commission. Hezbollah feared that the Tribunal would weaken its prime ally, Syria, and that it might establish a precedent that might be replicated, to legally try Hezbollah for its alleged role in terrorist actions in the 80s (Safa 2006:3). Claiming that the Cabinet is unconstitutional because of
the lack of representation of one of the major segments\textsuperscript{8}, the Shiite representative in the *Troika*, Nabih Berri, has refused to convene parliament, thus preventing the parliament from ratifying the tribunal. In other words, Hezbollah performs a sort of ‘empty-chair politics’ by refusing cabinet participation. Hence, a minority president, Berri, is able to thwart the majority’s will (Patrie and Espanol 2007b:8).

On one hand, the *Troika* guarantees cross-sectarian elite agreement in decisions. In this perspective, the *Troika* is essential to prevent majority rule and the exclusion of segments. On the other hand, power sharing in the top executive and mutual veto may lead to stalemate and deadlock. The ultimate consequence is a non-functioning democracy in which the institutions are unequipped to handle conflict. Consociationalism as we have seen can lead to low policy performance if actors pursue only their own interests. Consequently, governments are factionalized in the post-war period by heterogeneous ideological, political, and sectarian interests (Gebara 2007:6). The result is factionalized and rigid policy making.

Against this backdrop, prospects for accountability are low. Additionally, the practice of veto or high levels of conflict within the *Troika* or Cabinet may cause agency loss due to agents’ inability rather than unwillingness, according to the idea of Müller et al. (2003). It might be that representative agents do not act in the interests of their voters not because of moral hazard but because they are opposed or hindered by the other presidents or cabinet members. For instance, Speaker Nabih Berri has hindered the Parliament from functioning since he refuses to convene it.

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\textsuperscript{8} The Ta’if Agreement is ambiguous on this aspect. On one hand, it stipulates that the Cabinet is unconstitutional if more than one-third of its members resign. The Shiite ministers had 6 of 24 posts when the Cabinet was formed. Thus the Shiites did not constitute even one-third. On this basis the Cabinet is thus constitutional (Article 1.2. § 1. ـ). On the other hand, the Ta’if Agreement stipulates that every power (*sulta*) that contradicts the principle of mutual coexistence (*el-aysh el-moustarak*) (Article 1. 1. ـ) is illegitimate. On this basis, any Cabinet without participation from the most significant sects is illegitimate.
4.1.3 Foreign ‘Real Movers’ Hinder Domestic Accountability

In order to place responsibility for policy outcomes, principals need to identify ‘the real movers’ as seen in section 3.4. When decision making is not the sole responsibility of domestic elected officials, but is influenced by occupying states, foreign actors or regimes, accountability obviously is undermined. Agents may wish to act in their voters’ interests but can be hindered by certain contingencies produced by foreign interference. In Lebanon, the dangerous security situation and foreign interference have hindered elected representatives from performing their duties as deputies or cabinet members. I will now look at Lebanon’s external relations in order to assess information asymmetries.

Lebanon is located in a turbulent region that has a multitude of unresolved conflicts (Khalaf 2002:305). Historically, the country’s geopolitical position has turned Lebanon into a battlefield for the interests of regional and international actors (Ibid:7). Foreign powers and regional brokers have had a pivotal role in either inciting or containing conflict according to their regional interests. Ziadeh (2006:138–139) asserts that “[r]egional and international interventions have had – and still have, as was most recently witnessed with Hariri’s assassination in February 2005 – a major effect on whether Lebanon experiences intercommunal coexistence or conflict, and on whether it builds national cohesiveness or sinks into state disintegration”. Too many foreign ties can produce a weak Lebanon if the loyalty of important groups or segments to foreign states is greater than to the Lebanese state. Hudson (1988:235) argues that consociationalism can work only if the state is strong and autonomous.

Several foreign states and non-Lebanese actors have had, and still have, particular interests in Lebanon. Syria’s role in Lebanon, however, deserves particular emphasis. The Ta’if Agreement enabled Syrian hegemony over Lebanon (See sections 2.2 and 2.3). Syrian intervention was accepted by the international community due to strategic interests in the Middle East, such as the alliances in the Gulf War. By re-instituting the old communal system, Syria ensured its dominance as the system was reformed enough to stop the fighting, yet fragile enough to require a non-Lebanese arbitrator. Syria’s bid for political hegemony in Lebanon was primarily a geopolitical consideration (Ziadeh 2006:137). Later on, the occupation also served Syria’s economic interests. Syrian-Israeli
Conflict has played an especially pivotal role in Lebanese politics. Conflict has concentrated on the Israel-Palestine question\(^9\), the Shebaa farms\(^{10}\), and other broader regional interests.

Furthermore, countries have often used Lebanon as a confrontation arena in pursuing their regional and strategic interests. Ali Osseiran (2007 [Interview]), deputy in the Development and Resistance bloc, laments foreign interests in Lebanon:

*Lebanon* has been divided and subdivided, and it goes on and on, and we are at the meeting point between the West and the East where there is constant conflict. There is conflict between the Americans and the French within Lebanon, between the Syrians and the French, between the French and the Israelis, between the Americans and the Israelis, Syrians and the Israelis, between the Iranians and the Americans, and between the Israelis and the Iranians.

The domestic political forces’ ties to foreign powers have at times increased internal conflict. Ziadeh (2006:148) depicts the rules of the (communal) game in Lebanon as “combining pragmatic intercommunal alliances [see chapter 5] and regional patronage”. Hence, the various communities have gained regional patronage with their respective regional actors. Lebanese actors have financial, ideological, and/or cultural ties with foreign actors. The Sunni community in the post-war period has fostered regional ties to Saudi Arabia through Hariri whereas the Shiite community has ties to Iran and Syria. The Shiite ascendancy in the post-war period threatens the power balance with the two other communities represented in the *Troika*, the Maronites and the Sunnis (Ibid:149). In particular, *Hezbollah’s* close ideological and financial relations with Iran are criticised for enabling *Hezbollah* to create ‘a state within the state’. Insofar as political groups’ policies are elaborated externally, information asymmetries and chances of

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9 Palestinian refugees fled Palestine for Lebanon during the war preceding the creation of Israel in 1948 and later in the Six-day War of 1967. Today the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon is estimated to be around 400,000. (UNRWA [17.05.2008]).

10 Israel occupied the Shebaa farms during the Six-Day War of 1967. Since the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, the area has been a bone of confrontation. Israel sees it as part of the Israeli occupied Golan Heights whereas Lebanon claims it is part of South Lebanon (Kaufman 2004).
agency loss increase. It is uncertain how big a part of Hezbollah’s policies are made in Iran and how big a part in Lebanon, but interview data supports the view that policies are at least heavily influenced and condoned by Iran.

In the beginning of the 1990s, Saudi Arabia was restricted to protecting the Sunnis and limiting the influence of Iran and its Shiite allies because of the limitations imposed by Syria (Ziadeh 2006:148). The United States also played a low-key role prior to the Israeli retreat from South Lebanon in 2000 and the subsequent massive support to Hezbollah. Yet, they adopted a more aggressive approach after 2000 by backing the UN Resolution 1559 and calling for Lebanese sovereignty. Before 2000 there were one pro-Syrian Sunni-Druze-Shiite axis with a few Maronites on one hand and one anti-Syrian Christian-Maronite axis on the other. These two axes disintegrated after 2000 due to the change in Syrian leadership and the re-entry of the Americans, French, and Saudis into Lebanese politics in the wake of 9/11 and the demise of Saddam Hussein in Iraq (Ibid:161). Analyzing Lebanon’s external relations, Khalaf (2002:305) contends that:

The country remains largely impotent to act on issues destined to shape its political future. Ordinary Lebanese citizens, much like their political representatives, are still disempowered or not yet in a position to have a decisive impact on matters that directly affect their country’s political destiny or national sovereignty. As we have seen, Lebanon’s entry or exit from war, its involvement in the peace process, the outlines of its foreign policy; even the character of its electoral laws and local municipal elections are still largely shaped outside its borders.

Interviews with Lebanese political actors suggest that under Syrian occupation, elected representatives were hindered from internal decision making, or those who were elected were allies of the Syrian regime. Now when Syrian troops have pulled out, however, disagreement prevents decision and policy making within the Cabinet, according to cabinet Member Jean Hoggasabien (2007 [Interview]). Also, interviewed

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11 Resolution 1559 stipulates that all foreign troops redeploy from Lebanon, and that all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias be disarmed (UN SC S/Res/1559 (2004)). The latter will have consequences for Hezbollah and Palestinian armed groups within and outside the refugee camps.
elected representatives tell that with the end to Syrian monopoly, several other foreign interests are left more room to manoeuvre than previously. Foreign interference and pressure in the political crisis since 2005 have increased the institutional stalemate and made the confrontations between Lebanese domestic actors worse.

This shows that foreign interference and domestic groups’ ties to foreign states contribute to the undermining of accountability in post-war Lebanon.

4.2 Prospects for Representativeness

4.2.1 Representativeness of the Post-war Executive Power

Advocates of consociationalism argue that consociations correspond to an alternative democratic ideal that favors representativeness over competition (Andeweg 2000; Lijphart 1977). As consociations have ‘sacrificed’ some of the democratic criteria of majoritarian democracy to achieve higher representativeness and protection of minorities, one would expect that consociations should be very good at representativeness. In order to investigate the representativeness of consociations, O’Leary (2005), distinguishes between complete, concurrent, and weak democratic consociations, and between undemocratic consociations in which a significant segment is excluded either by a dominant coalition or voluntarily (See section 3.6.2). The distinction will be used to address the case of Lebanon.

In order to assess the executive power’s representativeness this section starts by examining the support levels of the three Troika members within their respective communities. Then the section examines the representativeness of the post-war cabinets by looking at the inclusion of confessions, political parties and groups. Finally it concludes that the Troika is weak and that post-war cabinets have had elements of voluntary and involuntary exclusion, but on the whole have been quite representative.
The Troika

The Troika is descriptively representative of the most significant segments in Lebanon as it comprises the Maronite, Sunni, and Shiite community. However, it is pertinent to ask if the Troika therefore fulfills the criteria for descriptive representativeness as only three of 18 communities are represented. The lines between significant and less significant segments must be assessed temporally and substantively. As of this writing (May 2008), the large demographic shares of the Maronite, Sunni, and Shiite communities justify their privileged position in the political system (See Table 2). The allocation of the ‘three presidencies’ to these communities can therefore be considered legitimate. However, the distribution of the posts among the three does not take into account demographic changes since the 1932 census (Compare Tables 1 and 2). The Shiites therefore feel disadvantaged as they constitute a larger demographic group than the Maronites who are allocated the Presidency, a more powerful post than Parliament Speaker.

The institutional arrangement whereby the Troika comprises but three posts naturally has lower prospects for representativeness. O’Leary’s (2003; 2005) measures representativeness by looking at the representation of political groups within one segment. Because the segments are represented only by one person in the Troika, the support levels of its members within their respective communities will be assessed instead. Figure 2 shows the support levels of the various Troika members in the post-war period.

First, Lebanon has had two post-war presidents (See Figure 2). Elias Hrawi was appointed President in November 1989. In 1995, the Syrian regime was able to obtain a constitutional amendment to renew his mandate for three years (Hudson 1999). Emile Lahoud was appointed President in November 1998. His mandate was extended in 2004 in violation of the Constitution (Lebanonwire [11.04.2008a]). Albeit the Christian community’s descriptive representation is ensured through the Presidency, the two former presidents’ substantive representativeness was undermined. The choice of Hrawi and Lahoud did not mirror the Christian electorate’s opinions in the post-war period. The Christian community’s support concentrated in the Lebanese Forces, General Michel Aoun’s movement, and the Maronite Patriarch and the Qurnet Shehwan Gathering.
(Knudsen 2005:6–7). All three political groups adopted a critical stance toward the Syrian regime and worked to end Syrian occupation. In contrast, the post-war presidents were allies and willing co-operators with the Syrian regime (Ziadeh 2006:154). Ziadeh (Ibid:160) contends that Syria alone chose the post-war presidents. Syria’s former President Hafez el-Assad was reported to have uttered during a meeting with former PM Hariri, “It is I alone who chooses the President of Lebanon” (Ibid). The Syrian regime has made sure that deputies are pro-Syrian to ensure that pro-Syrian presidents were elected and to ensure that the Presidents’ mandates were extended.

Figure 2: The Representativeness of the Troika

Second, the Prime Minister constitutes the second Troika member. Several prime ministers have served in the post-war years (See Figure 2). Hariri has dominated the Premiership in the post-war period. He headed three cabinets from October 1992 until December 1998, and two cabinets from October 2000 until October 2004 (Lebanonwire [18.02.08]). In between Omar Karami has headed two cabinets (December 1990–May
1992; October 2004–April 2005), Rashid el-Solh, Selim el-Hoss, and Najib Mikati have also headed one cabinet each. The 2005 Cabinet is headed by Fouad Siniora.

Hariri’s popularity was mostly on the rise during the 90s, but he received massive support after 2000, in particular in Beirut and Sidon. In the beginning of his first tenure (1992–98), Hariri was greeted with enthusiasm and confidence that the economy would improve (Hudson 1999). He had built his financial empire from scratch and challenged the traditional elite, such as the Karamis and Solhs (Gambill and Abdelnour 2001). Returning from Saudi Arabia in 1990, he began to invest in post-war reconstruction projects. Initially, the economy rebounded but in 1998 it was on the verge of catastrophe (Hudson 1999). Hariri was criticized for vast corruption and enfeebling the opposition. Nevertheless, a study conducted by Haddad (2002:219) shows that 52 percent of the Sunni community supported the Hariri Cabinet in 1998. In Hariri’s next tenure (2000–2004), he received massive support from the Sunni community, demonstrated by his electoral landslide in the 2000 elections (Gebara 2006). Hariri resigned in 2004 in protest over the extension of Lahoud’s mandate (Fattah 2005).

In 1998, Hariri was replaced by Selim Hoss. Hoss headed a technocrat cabinet that intended to ‘reform’ the economy and target corruption (Gambill and Abdelnour 2001). Hoss had some success, but the support withered as the country descended into economic recession. Furthermore, Omar Karami, who replaced Hariri as Prime Minister in 2004, had low support within the Sunni community. Public pressure and massive demonstrations after the assassination of Hariri ousted the pro-Syrian Karami Cabinet from power (Patrie and Espanol 2007a:25). Karami resigned and Najib Mikati was elected interim Prime Minister. Mikati’s main objective was to oversee the 2005 legislative elections. Foad Siniora, head of the 2005 Cabinet, has had tremendous support due to his close relationship with Saad Hariri. Future is by far the largest parliamentary bloc with 33 deputies (See Appendix 4).

Third, the Parliament Speaker constitutes the last Troika member (See Figure 2). Amal leader Nabih Berri has held the post since October 1992. Berri was reelected in 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2005 (Lebanonwire [11.04.08b]). He has held the post for 13 years. Thanks to his alliance with Hezbollah throughout most of the post-war period and
his backing from Syria, Berri has been able to stay in power. As Parliament Speaker, it is pertinent to say that Berri receives majoritarian support from the Shiite community for the way he fills his position. He has represented the Shiites and Hezbollah through his office, not just Amal. Hezbollah has increasingly mobilized slightly more Shiite voters than Amal has (See Appendix 3). Yet, as Parliament Speaker, Berri represents Hezbollah as much as his own party due to their alliance.

The overall conclusion on the Troika’s representativeness in the post-war period is that it is high on descriptive representativeness because it guarantees the representation of the three most significant segments. In this regard, consociationalism does lead to representativeness by a grand coalition. However, in substantive representativeness the Troika does not fare so well. This is most evident with regard to the Christian Presidency, which has received only minoritarian support within the Christian community. The post-war Presidents’ low support levels illustrate that descriptive representativeness does not necessarily lead to substantive representativeness. The predetermination of the Presidency to the Christian community has not resulted in the representation of dominant Christian opinions and interests within the Troika. Prior to 2005, the lack of representativeness of the Presidency was mostly caused by an adverse selection problem, resulting from Syrian occupation and the subservience of deputies (Haddad 2002:204–206).

In conclusion, Lebanon’s grand coalition can be considered weak as some of the segments give only minoritarian support. The Shiite and Sunni communities, however, have mainly given majoritarian support during the post-war period. Support to the Prime Minister has varied from minoritarian to majoritarian within the Sunni community.

The Council of Ministers

Precedence dictates that the Council of Ministers be formed on the basis of Muslim-Christian parity and that it includes cabinet members from six main confessional communities. The various cabinets have been heterogeneous and inclusive of several confessional communities (Gebara 2007:16). All post-war governments have met the
parity criterion and several confessional communities have been represented. On one hand, the Council is therefore descriptively representative of the segments. On the other hand, cabinets’ substantive representativeness has had some shortcomings. For example, political forces with significant popular support have been excluded.

There is one case of voluntary self-exclusion (See section 3.6.2). Despite electoral victory in parliamentary elections, Hezbollah has refused cabinet seats during the post-war period until 2005 when the party for the first time joined in a national unity cabinet headed by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. The other case is rather a case of involuntary exclusion, the exclusion of the FPM in the 2005 Cabinet. Hezbollah mobilizes a large part of the Shiite community and the FPM mobilizes a significant part of the Christian one. (See Appendix 3). The post-war cabinets have not lacked the representation of entire segments, however. Nonetheless, cabinets have lacked the representation of significant political forces within segments, as with Hezbollah and FPM. Exclusion of political groups with significant support reduces a cabinet’s substantive representativeness. Additionally, the current Cabinet lacks Shiite representation entirely as the Shiite ministers resigned. However, Amal and Hezbollah were included from the start in 2005 and nothing hinders them from coming back.

O’Leary (2003:717) contends that post-war cabinets in Lebanon have been complete. Post-war cabinets have been important for the representation of various confessions. Especially, inclusive cabinets have been pivotal for the smaller confessions that are not represented in the Troika. However, when one looks at the share of support for the political parties and groups represented in government, one sees that post-war cabinets correspond more to a weak consociation. In a weak consociation, each segment has elected political representatives but all or some of these leaders have only plurality support within their segments (O’Leary 2003). This applies at least to the Christian segment as the Syrian regime installed numerous Christian cabinet members before 2005, and because the largest Christian movement was excluded after 2005. As Hezbollah was not part of any post-war cabinet before 2005, the Shiite representation also lacked majority support during that time.
Thus, cabinets’ descriptive representativeness does not necessitate substantive representativeness. The process of forming governments and the Syrian influence prior to 2005 determined which groups entered the Cabinet. First, the process around the formation of the Cabinet is crucial. There is no automatic link between the legislature’s composition and cabinet formation guiding which groups should form cabinets. On one hand, it is argued that proportional system designs\textsuperscript{12} are better at producing representative executives or ‘grand coalitions’ (O’Leary 2003). Reilly (2005) claims voluntary agreements are more important for cabinet formation than electoral systems are. Regional, historical, and demographic patterns appear to have more explanatory power. My interview data concur that this is partly the case in Lebanon as alliances and negotiations have determined the formation of cabinets, for instance in 2005.

Second, the Syrian regime has strongly influenced the formation of cabinets. During Syrian occupation, cabinets were formed in order to ensure Syrian control and would include pro-Syrians, political leaders and/or their followers, and technocrats. The 2005 Siniora Cabinet was the first one without direct Syrian influence. It was a large national unity cabinet but nevertheless it left out one of the major Christian political forces, the \textit{FPM}. Interviews with several cabinet members suggest that Aoun was offered seats but that the \textit{FPM} did not accept the share it was offered. Farid Al-Khazen from \textit{FPM} claims that the electoral alliance between \textit{Future}, \textit{PSP}, \textit{Hezbollah}, and \textit{Amal} made a deal to exclude the \textit{FPM} (2007 [Interview]). Presumably, a government including the \textit{FPM} was difficult as Aoun wanted to present himself as the only Christian representative, according to cabinet member Jean Hogassabian (2007 [Interview]). Cabinet member Ahmad Fatfat (2007 [Interview]) stressed that it was an objective to create a broad national unity cabinet in 2005, but that \textit{March 14} rejected Aoun’s efforts to monopolize the Christian representation. Christian seats went to their Christian allies instead, the \textit{LF} and \textit{QSG}.

\textsuperscript{12} As we have seen, Lebanon seeks proportionality through a non PR-method.
The analysis of the representativeness of the *Troïka* and the cabinets shows that the post-war executive has been descriptively representative, but has severe shortcomings regarding substantive representativeness. Descriptive representativeness is therefore not sufficient to create democratic government.

4.2.2 Corruption and Poor Policy Performance

An assessment of the executive power’s substantive representativeness should also look at the performance of cabinets and how voters evaluate government. Haddad (2002:201) argues that voters have low trust in elected officials and are discontent with public policies in post-war Lebanon. Moreover, cabinets have shown poor policy performance and widespread corruption.

Risks arise for moral hazard and rent-seeking behaviour as accountability is substantially weakened in the absence of parliamentary monitoring. The structure of the *Troïka* and Cabinet has reduced prospects for accountability. Vast corruption and poor policy performance in the post-war period demonstrate that elected officials are not accountable. Moreover, the *Troïka*s institutional structure reinforced the relationship between confessionalism and corruption. Corruption became a means to maintain communal consensus and it was tolerated as long as it preserved peace (Gebara 2007:17).

According to the World Bank Governance Data, Lebanon scored 25–50\(^{13}\) on corruption control (2007 [01.05.2008]). Gebara (2007:17–18) asserts that consociationalism mainly causes the institutionalization of corruption in post-war Lebanon, and that “the post-war era witness[ed] a scramble for confessional control of state resources, public funds, and the appropriation of ministries” (Ibid). This strengthened the dependence on the sect. The consociational political system has induced corrupt, rent-seeking behavior in the post-war period. Citizens depend upon

\(^{13}\) In comparison, the Nordic countries averaged around 90-100 percent for corruption control (World Governance Data 2007 [01.05.2008]).
illicit benefits from politicians due to the sectarian distribution of seats in the executive, legislature, and state administration. In contrast a rational bureaucracy would meet citizens’ needs regardless of sectarian identity.

Corruption in the post-war period and poor policy performance – demonstrated by the government’s inability to reduce socioeconomic disparities – have resulted in a loss of public confidence in the state and the legitimacy of state institutions (Gebara 2007:18). Minister of Administrative Development, Jean Hoggasabian, told that the consociational political system makes it hard to institute administrative reforms as the level of political interference in the state administration is high (2007 [Interview]). The difficulties stem from direct links between citizens and public officials and between public officials and sectarian leaders. The sectarian nature of links results from the grand coalition, and sectarian distribution of legislative and public positions. The low electoral turn-out and boycotting are also evidence of a loss of confidence in the political regime and a gap between elected representatives and the electorate.

In conclusion, corruption, poor policy performance, and low trust in elected officials in the post-war period demonstrate that elected officials do not mirror the electorate’s opinions.
5 Elections

An electoral system can be designed to create incentives and constraints so as to achieve particular outcomes (Reilly and Andrews 1998:191). Parliamentary elections have been held four times in post-war Lebanon: 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2005. Alliance making, vote pooling and bargaining have structured the election results (Salloukh 2006). Institutional structures such as sectarian distribution of seats, vote pooling and inter-sectarian alliances presumably lead to sectarian moderation and conflict management by causing the emergence of a multi-sectarian coalition at the centre of the political center (Horowitz cited in Ibid:641, 2002; Reynolds 2002; Reilly 2001). Analyzing the post-war period until 2000, Salloukh (2006) contends that inter-confessional alliances have produced flaws in accountability, representation and contestation, and lead to the election of sectarian rather than national politicians.

The chapter is divided into two main sections which assess accountability and representativeness respectively. The chapter starts by examining the nature of electoral alliances in post-war Lebanon. Analyzing the post-war parliamentary elections, this thesis finds that alliances are cross-ideological, short term and tactical, and have not lead to the election of more moderate politicians. Instead, the alliances have undermined accountability and representativeness. Second, the chapter analyses how alliances have resulted in the absence of competition within communities, reducing the potential for accountability. Third, the chapter analyses how vote pooling and alliances affect descriptive and substantive representativeness. For example, the electoral system has undermined the Christian community’s substantive representativeness in particular.
5.1 Prospects for Accountability

5.1.1 Short Term, Tactical, and Cross-Ideological Alliances

Post-war parliamentary elections in Lebanon are contested by inter-confessional alliances in multi-confessional electoral districts (Salloukh 2006). The various institutional determinants of the electoral laws of 1992, 1996, and 2000 structure the alliances. The nature of the alliances varies to a certain extent due to the sectarian distribution and political cleavages within the given electoral district (Ibid:640). Salloukh (2006) analyzes the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections and finds that electoral candidates ally despite divisions over ideological and political issues, e.g. the roles of religion and the state in society, and social issues, economic development, and foreign policy (Ibid:640). First, the typical pattern in electoral districts with a clear demographic majority by a particular sect is cross-ideological alliances among the main confessional groups. Candidates from other sectarian groups are incorporated into the list to achieve the predetermined sectarian ratio. Second, in districts where the sectarian distribution is more equal, inter-confessional alliances are formed in order to eliminate competition from rival lists. Third, districts dominated by one sect and one strong political leader create alliances formed by the leader, in which the remaining candidates from other confessions are picked and included into the lists.

In sum, electoral alliances in post-war Lebanon are generally short term, tactical and cross-ideological. The particular nature of the alliances has three main results. First, alliances result in the absence of competition. Second, cross-ideological alliances lack coherent and stable choices for the electorate. Third, the alliances have not led to moderation or accommodation. The consequences of alliance making thus undermine accountability. Lack of competition limits voters’ ability both to control and to influence politicians: without alternatives incumbents cannot be sanctioned; and representative agents cannot be selected. Below, the nature of alliance making in the post-war elections will be examined chronologically.
Post-War Parliamentary Elections

The electoral law’s institutional determinants and Syrian influence lead to limited political competition in the 1992 elections (Al-Khazen 1998). The elections produced short term electoral alliances instead of durable political alliances as proposed by the moderate-focused incentivism approach. Tactical, short term alliances have favoured sectarian leaders and lead to a depoliticization of political life, exclusion of political forces, and lack of coherent political choices. In the South electoral district, Amal, Hezbollah, and Bahaya Hariri, Hariri’s sister, contested the elections together. The three political actors allied despite deep differences over numerous ideological and political issues, such as the role of religion in society, the appropriate strategy toward Israel, and the role of the state in society (Salloukh 2006). The alliance in the South excludes rival lists and candidates. One example is the case of Habib Sadek, a Sunni secular, heading the Council of Reconstruction in the South. Sadek had significant popular support at the time, but was eliminated by the alliance (Kassir 1997). That allied parties or groups in one electoral district may be competitors in another one, moreover, demonstrates the cross-ideological and apolitical character of the electoral alliances. For instance, in the Ba’alback-Hermel electoral district in the Beqa’, the Hezbollah-Amal alliance contested the elections alone (Salloukh 2006:642). In the North, an alliance was made between long time enemies Suleiman Franjieh and Omar Karami in order to exclude LF leader Samir Geagea from power.

Short term, tactical alliances without the potential for durable political compromise also characterized the 1996 elections. The Amal-Hezbollah alliance contested the elections in the South and in the Beqa’. In the Ba’abda-Aley electoral district Amal went against Hezbollah’s list together with Future, PSP, and the Maronite pro-Syrian politician Elie Hobeika. In Beirut, Hariri went against Hezbollah (Gebara 2006:646). There were several inter-confessional lists in the North electoral district.

The 2000 elections were dominated by Hariri’s increasing popularity. The 2000 electoral law split Beirut into three districts (See Table 4). Hariri’s Dignity List contested the elections alone in two of the three Beirut districts (Lebanonwire [06.05.2008]). In the second district, Hariri and Hezbollah made an alliance. At first, Hariri intended to ally
with another Shiite candidate but withdrew the initial candidate from the list to allow for the victory of Hezbollah’s own candidate (Salloukh 2006:650). In return, Hezbollah voted for Bahaya Hariri in the South. Hence, mutual electoral gains motivated the alliance despite antagonistic relations and crucial disagreement over Hariri’s harmful neo-liberal policies affecting Hezbollah’s urban and rural constituencies and Hariri’s wish to deploy the Lebanese army along the Lebanese-Israeli borders. In the South, the alliance also included Amal, even though Hezbollah wanted to run alone in elections due to the party’s massive support after the end to Israeli occupation in 2000. However, the Syrian regime pressured Hezbollah to ally with Amal (Salloukh 2006:647). Throughout the post-war period, the Syrian regime sought to ensure some degree of intra-confessional competition as a strong sectarian leadership could challenge the Syrian regime’s position. In the Ba’albak-Hermel electoral district, pro-Syrian political actors Hezbollah, Amal, SSNP, Ba’ath Party, and pro-Syrian wing of Kata’ib allied despite different ideologies.

In the 2005 elections the electoral alliance between March 14 and the Hezbollah-Amal axis demonstrates how the elite manipulate the electoral system to sustain their position. The electoral alliance that secured a majority in the 2005 elections did not correspond with the popular majority of the street that had expressed itself on March 14 (Favier 2006:8). The electoral alliance excluded a large part of the Christian public supporting the FPM, who had participated in March 14 and called for an end to Syrian occupation. Cabinet Member Ahmad Fatfat from Future explained why March 14 chose to contest elections in alliance with Hezbollah:

> There is a problem within four electoral districts: Beirut, South-Beqa’, Ba’abda-Aley, and North-Beqa’. It was evident that we would lead electoral battles in all these regions, thus the electoral alliances had purely electoral interests. We said ‘fine’ we will not present ourselves at the elections in the North- and South-Beqa’ but will include a candidate from Hezbollah in the Hariri-list in Beirut. So we left the seat open. In exchange, Hezbollah will support us in Ba’abda. Hence, everyone gained from the alliance (2007 [Interview], my translation).

Moreover, discussions around the electoral law, whether to postpone the parliamentary elections and adopt a new electoral law or continue with the 2000 law, postponed the 2005 electoral campaign. The Christian community in particular suffered
from the 2000 law. Finally, Future, PSP, Amal, and Hezbollah agreed to go with the current law despite protests from the majority of the Christian leaders (Favier 2006:8–9). Thus, March 14 (Future, QSG, and the PSP, without FPM participation) struck an alliance with Hezbollah in several districts (Gebara 2006:9). The alliance resulted in practically no competition in any of the Beirut districts. In Mount Lebanon, FPM leader Aoun allied with his all-time political opponent and pro-Syrian candidate Suleiman Franjieh (Ibid:10).

Table 6: Summary over Main Electoral Alliances Compared with Political Alliances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections *</th>
<th>Pre-Electoral Alliances</th>
<th>Political Alliances in Parliament</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| 1996       | • Amal-Hezbollah (South, Beqa’
• Hezbollah-Future-PSP-Elie Hobeika (Mount Lebanon) | • Hariri-Amal-Karami-Jumblatt-Hezbollah-Armenian Bloc-SSNP-Hrawi Bloc |
| 2000       | • Hariri (Beirut 1)
• Hariri-Hezbollah (Beirut 2)
• Amal-Hariri-Hezbollah (South) | • Beirut Decision Bloc (Hariri)-PSP-QSG-DR
• Amal-Hezbollah-SSNP-Ba’th |
| 2005       | • Future-PSP-Amal-Hezbollah (most/all districts) | • Hezbollah-Amal-SSNP-Ba’th-Kata’ib- (FPM)
• FPM-Metn Bloc
• PSP-Future-LF-QSG-DLM-DR-Reform Kata’ib |


*Information of the 1992–1996 period is not included due to the inability to obtain reliable data. One possible explanation is that there were few stable alliance patterns in this period combined with a high number of non-partisans in parliament.

Deputies that I interviewed maintain that the Syrian regime constituted the main driving force behind alliance making in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections. The 2005 elections were on the contrary held after the Syrian withdrawal. The 2005 observations may therefore separate the importance of the electoral system’s institutional determinants vis-à-vis the Syrian influence on alliance making. Syria was still a factor in
the 2005 elections, but not to the same extent as before 2005 when the regime intervened directly in forming alliances, by recruiting or vetoing particular candidates.

As we have seen, it was the electoral alliance between the sectarian leaders of *Future*, *PSP*, *Amal*, and *Hezbollah*, which secured their electoral victory in 2005. This alliance was not different from the alliances during the pre-Syrian order in terms of its tactical, short term, and cross-ideological nature. Thus, alliance making did not differ much from elections under the Syrian occupation in this regard. This supports the conclusion that the system contains incentives for tactical ends and manipulation by sectarian leaders. Table 6 below demonstrates the differences in electoral alliances and parliamentary alliances in the post-war period.

### 5.1.2 Absence of Competition, Coherent Alternatives, and Moderation

This section discusses the three main consequences of vote pooling and alliance making more thoroughly in relation to agency problems and accountability. The main consequences are absence of competition, lack of coherent and stable choices, and non-moderation. First, alliance making in the post-war period limits political competition and the contestatory aspect of elections (Salloukh 2006). In the 1992 elections, a record number of candidates won unopposed or with nominal competition (Al-Khazen 1998). Unopposed candidates are counted as candidates that face no rivals from the same sect in the electoral constituency. Candidates with nominal competition have opponents with no winning chance\(^{14}\). The total number of those unopposed, or with nominal competition, was 54, about 42 percent of the deputies. Competition is higher in smaller, more heterogeneous districts, like the electoral districts in Mount Lebanon. In contrast, in the South, the North, and the Beqa’, with larger multi-member constituencies and inter-confessional electoral alliances, the electoral alliances have been dubbed *mahdala*

\(^{14}\) Opponents without chance of winning either lacked popular base or they were not part of a list. Thus, they had a technical chance of winning although such candidates were picked by the authorities so that competition should seem greater (Al-Khazen 1998)
(bulldozers) and busta (electoral buses) since 1995. The EU Election Observation Mission (2005:17) characterized the lists as “mere vehicles in which individual and sometimes rival political groups or figures ‘hop into’ in order to ‘crush’ all others and win the district’s entire seats”.

Absence of competition has undermined the vertical dimension of citizen control. The existence of alternatives conditions the possibility to sanction or select representative agents. Without real alternatives, voters’ capability of holding politicians accountable, either by sanctioning incumbents or selecting representative agents, is severely limited. Alliances are negotiated at elite level without much consideration for political actors’ popular support. This increases the gap between representatives and the people, and thus the possibility for agency loss. Elections may ensure accountability by reducing agency floss presuming officials want re-election (Manin et al. 1999). Yet in Lebanon, because of low competition a candidate’s electoral victory depends more on elites’ compiling of lists than voters’ opinions. Elections therefore induce electoral candidates to befriend the current elite to enter a list.

Second, cross-ideological alliances result in absence of coherent political alternatives. Political actors with different ideological stances and different opinions on several issues have allied in post-war Lebanon. For instance, the Druze PSP leader Jumblatt has allied with the Hariris since the mid 90s. However, alongside Druzism\textsuperscript{15}, the PSP’s ideological roots are found in socialism, while Harirism entails neo-liberal policies such as liberalization and privatization. Hariri’s fiscal and privatization policies have lead to greater disparities between rich and poor in Lebanon (Perthes 1997:17; Salloukh 2006:650). PSP deputy Wael Abou Faour (2007 [Interview 2007]) agreed that:

\textsuperscript{15} Druzism is a strict monotheistic faith that believes in an esoteric (inner) interpretation of the Quran in addition to an exoteric (literal) interpretation (Swayd 1998).
Moreover, the alliances in one district often contradict the ones in other districts. The 1996 election in which Hariri contested *Hezbollah* in Beirut but allied with *Hezbollah* in the Beqa’ is an example. Or alliances may include both cabinet supporters and opponents. For instance, both pro- and anti-Syrian forces allied in 2005. In 1996, three out of four competing lists included cabinet supporters and opponents (EU EOM 2005:17). Electoral alliances’ cross-ideological aspect thus hinders voters from choosing between coherent set of political actors and ideas. Coherent alternatives are an essential condition for the vertical dimension of citizen control. For instance, sanctioning incumbent elected representatives becomes impossible when the incumbents join their opponents on electoral lists. Albeit the *tashtib* (cross-out) practice allows citizens to vote only for certain candidates on the list, there are seldom other electoral candidates with realistic winning chances (Al-Khazen 1998).

Third, vote pooling and inter-confessional alliances have not produced durable political alliances between moderate politicians (Salloukh 2006). Horowitz (2002:23–24) contends that vote pooling promotes incentives for the emergence of durable inter-sectarian coalitions of moderate politicians. In Lebanon, inter-confessional alliances rather demonstrate a lack of consistency between political discourse, the political stands, and alliances (EU EOM 2005:17). In other words, the alliances produce a gap between discourse and practice. Although sectarian leaders in multi-member constituencies change their discourse in order to attract voters from other confessions, the incentive for moderation ceases to exist after elections are held.

The alliances do not have the potential to promote long term national unity and moderation because they are short term in nature (Salloukh 2006:641). The electoral alliances end as soon as elections held, or even during elections, as the lists are not closed and may be subject to changes. The call for moderation therefore stops after elections are held. Closed lists, in contrast, force long term alliances (Salloukh 2007 [Interview]). Political actors who ally on closed lists know that the whole list or none at
all get elected. Closed lists thus give stronger incentives for candidates to compromise on positions and issues before elections. Closed lists have greater potential for producing long term moderation that would also result in a change of practice.

Furthermore, the gap between discourse and practice increase information asymmetries between agents and principals. Although a change from a sectarian discourse to a more moderate one may seem positive at first, “it distorts the political game” (Touma 2007 [Interview], my translation). In particular, the vote pooling system induces politicians to manipulate information and present themselves as more moderate to gain cross-confessional votes. Vote pooling therefore prevents the electorate from learning about electoral candidates’ real intentions and inter-confessional alliances may thus result in adverse selection. This problem concerns cross-confessional districts. There is more sectarian discourse in the few uni-confessional electoral districts in Lebanon. But as seen from the above, it is a superficial difference.

5.1.3 Monopolization of the Muslim Communities

Consociationalists argue that consociations can be democratic on the basis that democratic opposition within communities is not eliminated: “Nothing precludes intrabloc democratic competition, or the turnover of political elites, or shifts of support between parties” (O’Leary 2005:11, my italics). This section, however, shows that the post-war period can be characterized by an absence of political competition within communities. One exception is the Christian community with multiple leaderships, although two main groups, FPM and LF, increasingly mobilize a significant part of the Christian electorate after 2005. This suggests a tendency of less fragmentation, albeit conclusions cannot be drawn yet. The Christian community is analyzed in the next section. This section analyzes the gradual monopolization of the Muslim communities in the post-war period. It concerns the Sunni, Druze communities, and to a certain extent the Shiite one (Favier 2006). The development within the Sunni, Shiite, and Druze community will be described respectively, and then explained, below.

The Sunni community has gradually been monopolized by Hariri in the post-war period. Hariri faced competition up until the 2000 elections (Gebara 2007 [Interview]).
The Sunni community was diverse and it took time to consolidate Hariri’s political leadership (Salloukh 2007 [Interview]). Hariri was a self-made man and challenged the traditional Sunni elite, like Rashid Solh and Omar Karami. Volker Perthes (1997:19–20) labels the Hariri approach to post-war consolidation since he became Prime Minister in 1992 as *functional authoritarianism*. The Hariri-project consisted of a strong emphasis on creating a friendly business climate and physical restoration, but also a strong element of *authoritarianism* that was not limited to the simple restoration of state functions after the war. Public demonstrations were banned, and many people with connections to oppositionals were arrested, and media pluralism was undermined.

In the late 1990s, Hariri took a more critical stance toward the Syrian regime (Ziadeh 2006:155). Hariri increasingly backed anti-Syrian Christian and Druze politicians although he did not make it public. The Syrian regime began to see Hariri as a threat before the 2000 elections. Although the Syrian regime gerrymandered elections to hinder Hariri from winning, Hariri’s Dignity List swept a landslide in Beirut and other Sunni strongholds (Gebara 2006:6). Hariri’s popular strength was severely miscalculated in the 2000 elections. The death of the Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and the subsequent power struggle hindered equally strict control and monitoring of political life in Lebanon as earlier. Until 2000 monopoly tendencies within communities had been countered by the Syrian regime when monopoly was seen contrary to Syrian interests. Hariri was close to the Syrians before 1998 (Gambil and Abdelnour 2005), but he was at most condoned when he entered his second tenure (2000–2004). The assassination of Hariri in 2005 increased the support to his son Saad Hariri who succeeded his father in a hereditary manner. Since 2005 Saad Hariri has enjoyed more support than his father.

The Shiite community has been represented by the *Hezbollah-Amal* axis in the post-war period (Favier 2006:11). This axis has been relatively stable in post-war Lebanon. The two compete among each other, but their alliance prevents other Shiite currents from appearing. *Hezbollah* ran in elections first time in 1992 and won the highest number of seats (See Appendix 3). It constituted the largest single parliamentary party bloc in 1992 (Harik 2004:1, 43–53). Hezbollah quickly adopted a pragmatic approach to “the typical Lebanese ‘get-the-seat’ mentality with ideology out of the window” (Salibi cited in Ibid:77). Rivalry between the two Shiite actors *Amal* and *Hezbollah* began in the
mid 80’s but Syria imposed rules that restricted competition in the Israeli occupied areas (Harik 2004:95, 151). Amal and Hezbollah were pressured to ally on lists in the South and the Beqa’. Competition was open for Shiite contenders only in Ba’abda, Beirut, and Jbeil. In the 2000 elections, the Hezbollah-Amal electoral list swept the Beqa’ and the South. Their status as the biggest parliamentary bloc remained with 9 seats (See Appendix 3).

Political leadership within the Druze community has historically been shared between two families, the Arslans and the Jumblatts. During the 1990s Jumblatt still faced challenges on traditional grounds by the Yazbaki faction (Arslans) (Hudson 1999). Yet, Walid Jumblatt has gradually strengthened his position since 2000. The 2005 elections secured him as the Druze community’s uncontested leader (Favier 2006:11). The Druze have traditionally played a far more important role in Lebanon than to be expected from their demographic share. At the end of the 90s, however, Hudson (Ibid) claimed that their role appeared to be shrinking. However, Jumblatt’s alliance with Saad Hariri since 2005 reinstituted the important role that the Druze had in the system.

In post-war Lebanon, the absence of intra-group competition within the Sunni, Druze, and Shiite communities results from electoral alliances, plurality voting, and Syrian interference spoiling natural democratic competition. First, alliance making has contributed to sustain sectarian leaders. The electoral alliance between Future, Amal, Hezbollah, and PSP secured a victory of Hariri, Berri, Nasrallah, and Jumblatt (Favier 2006). In particular, the 2005 elections consolidated Hariri’s and Jumblatt’s monopoly positions within the Sunni and Druze communities (Ibid:10). The Quadruple Alliance, including Hariri, Berri, Nasrallah, and Jumblatt, was made after the Syrian withdrawal. Hezbollah and Amal would give the other two parties a clear electoral majority in cabinet in exchange of an end to request the disarmament of Hezbollah.

Favier (2006:8, 10) claims that the 2005 elections constitute the end to pluralist leadership in Lebanon. The 2005 elections were different because voters did not use the tasbitib (cross-out) practice. It is not uncommon that sectarian leaders appeal to citizens to vote for entire lists without making adjustments. Still, the tasbitib practice has been rather common (Touma 2007 [Interview]). Voters’ behavior can be understood in the political context of the Cedar Revolution. The support to Hariri and March 14 was high.
Favier (2006:10, fn 19) argues that most deputies were elected because they belonged to a list put together by a sectarian leader and because citizens voted for entire lists. People thus followed Hariri’s appeal to vote for the entire list, “Zay ma heyya” [Ar. As she is] (Fatfat 2007 [Interview]).

Second, plurality voting has impeded pluralism within communities and contributed to monopolize communities. Plurality voting in multi-member districts has favoured the emergence of a single leadership within each sect. As Saad (2007 [22.10.2007]) put it, the majority-vote system has “exclude[ed] political forces from parliamentary representation or [failed] to enable them to achieve such representation”. Various analysts, (e.g. Ibid; Salem 2006) argue that a strict PR system would end sectarian leaders’ monopoly and allow for new groups to enter parliament. PR is therefore preferred over the Lebanese way of achieving proportionality through predetermination. With plurality voting in multi-member districts, each electoral candidate may win a seat from a plurality of the votes. All the other candidates get nothing although their share may not be far from the winners’ share. It therefore becomes very difficult for smaller groups, or groups with dispersed regional support, to be represented. In contrast, a PR system, in particular in one nation-wide district, produces better conditions for smaller groups.

My interview data shows that most political actors benefiting from plurality voting as of this writing (May 2008) do not wish to reform the electoral system. Cabinet member Ahmad Fatfat (2007 [Interview], my translation) recognized this:

This is the core of the Lebanese problem (...). It is due to the majoritarian system. Since many years, I have fought for the proportional system, but it is contrary to the opinion of my movement [Future]. Within the Sunni community there is one bloc that controls everything; in the Shi’ite community there is one bloc that controls everything. In the Christian it is more diverse but not very much. (...) progressively the community is turning towards two blocs, the LF and Aoun. There exists a uniformity which is very dangerous due to the electoral system. For instance, you can win a region with 35 percent. (...). The result is that there are no more people who present themselves for elections because it doesn’t matter anyway.
Third, in all the post-war elections before 2005, the Syrian intelligence services have been an important factor in the compiling of electoral lists in order to create a subservient pro-Syrian clientele. The Syrian regime encouraged intra-confessional rivalry by a divide and rule strategy when it served Syrian interests. Other times the regime gained more by controlling conflict, such as within the Shiite community (Johnson 2001:251). The Sunni and Druze leaderships were solidified because they did not face direct intervention from the Syrian regime after 2005.

Monopolization of communities challenges accountability on several accounts. The lack of democratic competition limits accountability according to a government accountability mode because voters cannot sanction incumbents (Powell 2000). Voters’ ability to select representative agents according to an authorized representation mode is equally limited. Furthermore, monopoly increases power struggles among the elites, and communal fear increases the power of sectarian leaders. Consociational and integrative theory both argue that monopoly within segments is favorable to reduce sectarian conflict because sectarian leaders can compromise more easily (Lijphart 1977:25–26; Horowitz 2002:29). In Lebanon, monopolization of the Muslim communities has instead resulted in power struggles and increased sectarian tensions. Zahar (2007 [Interview]) and Salloukh (2007 [Interview]) argue that sectarian leaders’ monopoly positions allow them to control their communities by playing on sectarianism and fear. Belloni (cited in Roeder and Rotchild 2005:332) opines that “by fostering community isolation, mobilization, and a general feeling of insecurity, ethnic elites legitimize each other and maintain a tight grip on their constituencies. An increasing Sunni-Shiite rivalry has emerged in the post-war period (Richani 1998:136–137).
5.2 Prospects for Representativeness

5.2.1 Lack of Substantive Representation of the Christian Community

The Ta’if Agreement prescribes parity of representation (5:5) between Christians and Muslims in parliament even though this does not correspond with actual population figures that indicate that the share of Christians to Muslims is around 3–4:6–7 (See Table 2). Christians are overrepresented whereas Muslims are underrepresented. Nevertheless, the Christian community has faced marginalization and a crisis of representativeness in the post-war years. Boycott of the parliamentary elections and low electoral turn out reflect the community’s dissatisfaction over the electoral laws. Vote pooling, electoral alliances, and Syrian interference have undermined substantive representativeness.

The structure of segments conditions substantive representativeness. Decohesion within one community may exclude some groups from political power (Lijphart 1977). Multiple Christian leaderships have contributed to the lack of substantive representativeness. The absence of a strong Christian leader weakens Christians’ position within the system vis-à-vis powerful Sunni, Druze, and Shiite leaders. Yet, in a broader, national perspective, the intra-Christian fissure may also contribute to a process of deconfessionalization and democratization of political life (Khoury 2007). Post-war developments will be analyzed below with regard to the Christian community. The analysis shows that vote pooling, recruitment structures, and Syrian interference undermined substantive representativeness. Finally, the section discusses the relation between descriptive and substantive representativeness.

Post-War Developments

The fragmentation of the Christian community peaked in the last war years and during the negotiation of the Ta’if agreement. Electing President Amine Gemayel’s successor was attempted in 1988 but the local and regional power configuration undermined an orderly transfer of power (Al-Khazen 1998). Gemayel opposed transfer of power, and
the two other leading Christian figures – the head of the Army, Aoun, and the leader of the \textit{LF}, Samir Geagea – rejected the US-Syrian imposed candidacy of Mikhail Daher. The fragmented state into two de facto governments: one headed by Aoun and another by Selim Hoss. The negotiation of the Ta’if Agreement, the 1992 elections, and the Ta’if’s Agreement faulted implementation split the Christian community into various positions (Ibid). The negotiation of the Ta’if Agreement split the Christian community into supporters (\textit{Kata’ib}, \textit{LF}, and the Patriarch) and opponents (Aoun). The partial implementation alienated the Christian groups who participated in its making. The 1992 parliamentary elections elicited widespread opposition and boycott based on several objections. First, Christian groups rejected the 1992 electoral law because of substantial gerrymandering that marginalized their vote. A significant part of the Christian elite argued that their share of political power was unacceptable (Perthes 1997:20, 21, fn 13; Karamé [Interview]). This concerned the \textit{LF}, \textit{National Liberal Party}, and \textit{Opposition Kata’ib}. Second, the problem of displaced Christians\textsuperscript{16} after the war was not sorted out. The electoral law stipulates that citizens must vote in their home district. Displaced Christians were therefore not able to vote. Third, the Christian groups objected the selective disarming of militia groups in which \textit{Hezbollah} remained with a military wing.

The boycott and low electoral turn-out in the 1992 parliamentary elections decreased the representativeness and the legitimacy of the election results. In Beirut, only 1.6 percent of the Maronites cast their votes, while 30 percent of the Sunnis did so (Gebara 2006). The turn-out rate for the totality of the sects was low, 30 percent, compared with a pre-war average around 50 percent (Al-Khazen 1998). Al-Khazen (1993:62) holds that the 1992 parliamentary elections “produced the least representative parliament since independence, had the lowest voter turnout, and brought to office the largest number of unopposed candidates in the history of Lebanon’s parliamentary elections.”

\textsuperscript{16} 70 percent out of nearly half a million displaced persons after the war are Christians (Al-Khazen 2001).
Boycott was repeated again in the 1996 elections. Albeit the electoral turnout was higher than in 1992 it was still low (Gebara 2006:4). In Beirut only 17 percent of the Maronites voted compared to 40 percent of the Sunnis. Consequently, the Christian boycott and the low electoral turnout resulting from opposition to the electoral law have challenged a fair substantive representation of the Christian community.

In the 2000 and 2005 elections, all major Christian political groups participated. However, according to many Christians, they were still unable to have a meaningful share in the parliament (EU EOM 2005:18–19). The vote pooling system has contributed to widespread opposition by Christian leaders and the so-called ‘Christian frustration’ (*al-ihbat al-masihi*). Vote pooling has lead to inter-confessional alliances in multi-member constituencies with politicians depending on votes from a cross-confessional electorate (Horowitz 2002). In theory, both Muslim and Christian politicians should be elected by a cross-segmental electorate. But in practice, many Christian deputies are elected by a Muslim majority electorate, and few Muslim deputies are elected by a Christian majority electorate. This is caused by the constituency structure, district magnitude, and the lower demographic share of Christian. Boycott and the displacement issue further decreased the number of Christian votes.

For instance, 23 Christian deputies were elected by Muslims, i.e. 36 per cent of the Christian deputies in the 1992 elections (Al-Khazen 1998). In all the post-war elections, Christian deputies in the South electoral district(s) were elected by a Muslim majority because the number of Muslim votes exceeds Christian ones. In 1992 there were almost four times as many Muslim voters as Christian ones (397,017 against 107,793) only in 1992 (Al-Khazen 1998). The four Christian deputies in Jezzine and the one in Zahrani have been elected by a predominantly Muslim electorate in the post-war period. In the North, the two Maronite deputies in Bsharri are elected in the same manner. According to Ziadeh (2006:143), the votes of the Sunnis decide the election of the Armenian, Maronite, and Orthodox deputies in Beirut (See Table 4).

In comparison, the influence of Christian voters was decisive for only three Muslim deputies of all the electoral districts in the 1992 elections. This effect of the
electoral system is conceived and experienced as a major injustice (ghubn) by the Christian community, and has lead to a feeling of non-representation (Ziadeh 2006:154).

In addition to the structural determinants, alliance making and the composition of electoral lists have contributed to the lack of substantive representation of the Christian community. Elias Karamé (2007 [Interview], my translation) from the Opposition Kata’ib expressed that:

[The electoral law] excludes the Christians. The Christians couldn’t elect their deputies; they were influenced by the Muslim majority. In certain regions they [the Muslims] installed the Christians by themselves, like in Mount Lebanon. Thus, there are people who are eliminated automatically: in Ashrafie [Election district in Beirut] it was Hariri who nominated the deputies; in the South they were nominated by Hezbollah. This, we could not accept.

Karamé mentions sectarian leaders’ role in the compiling of lists. As we have seen, many electoral districts with a Muslim majority have so-called 'bulldozer lists' sweeping all the seats. Sectarian elites often compile the lists without considering the popular base of the Christian candidates. Kiwan (2007 [Interview, my translation] concurs that sectarian leaders’ role in compiling the lists is problematic:

[What is even more troublesome [than the fact that Christian deputies are elected by a Muslim electorate] is that many of the Christian deputies are chosen by Muslim leaders. Hence, it is not even the Muslim electorate who has expressed herself, but the Muslim leaders who have decided to include x, y, z Christian candidates.

Additionally, the Syrian regime sought to marginalize anti-Syrian politicians by including pro-Syrian electoral candidates on electoral lists prior to 2005. The Syrian intelligence services inserted pro-Syrian candidates into the lists. These deputies were not representative of the Christians in the post-war years.

Hence, vote pooling, recruitment structures, and Syrian interference have undermined substantive representativeness. Parts of the Christian community feel that they have been deprived of electing representatives mirroring their views and opinions.
This is an adverse selection problem and has widened the gap between the Christian elites in power and the Christian electorate. Although Christians are overrepresented, it has not increased the substantive representation of the Christian community, but rather the contrary.

**Descriptive versus Substantive Representation**

The question of sectarian representation is highly controversial in Lebanon and is also reflected in the Ta’if Agreement’s inherent contradictions. The issue has several aspects. On one hand, several leading Christian figures, the Patriarch and the QSG among others, insist upon equitable political representation (*sihat al-tamthil al-siyasi*) (Salloukh 2006:653). They insist upon the middle-size electoral districts (*aqdy*ła) ranging from three to six seats instead of larger districts (*mohafazat*) with a numerical Muslim dominance (Salloukh 2005:30; Knudsen 2005:9). The Patriarch argues that smaller electoral districts create a more balanced representation (L’Orient-Le Jour [05.03.08]). If the districts are reduced in size, more districts will become uni-confessional. In uni-confessional districts, Christians would elect Christians and Muslims would elect Muslims. Yet, many Muslims claim that the adoption of small electoral districts violates the spirit of the Ta’if Agreement (As-Safir [05.03.08]). Ta’if’s spirit entails that a deputy should be elected by both communities. However, the conceptualization of the mandate of the Lebanese deputy is ambivalent (Kiwan 2007 [Interview]). The Constitution stipulates that the deputy represents the nation and not his community only, but it is unclear whether a deputy is legitimate if the community prefers another candidate (Ibid).

Moreover, it has been argued that the Christian call for equitable sectarian representation may contradict the principle of mutual coexistence (*al-aysh al-moushtarak*)

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17 The Ta’if Agreement stipulates that elections should take place on the basis of the *mohafaza* (region pl. *mohafazat*). Yet, it also stipulates that Lebanon should undergo an administrative reform and redraw the lines of the current *mohafazat* (Ta’if Agreement found in Ziadeh (2006) Appendix L: Article 1.2, 14)
as voting will take place along confessional lines only (Salloukh 2005). The call for equitable sectarian representation entails keeping parity between Christians and Muslims, and that Christian voters mainly should choose Christian representatives. On one hand, voting along pure confessional lines may harden sectarian identity (Horowitz 1985, 2002; Reynolds 2002, Roeder and Rotchild 2005). On the other hand, sectarian identity may be conceived as a more stable feature of plural societies, unchangeable through electoral engineering (Lijphart 1977; O’Leary 2005). Both experts and politicians assert in my interviews that inter-confessional alliances may have “advantages in terms of preventing the breakdown of the system in terms of narrow confessional lines” (Zahar 2007 [Interview]). Muslim politicians also voiced concern over the possible consequences of adopting the qada as electoral district, arguing that it will “push us back” and that politicians will “become more extremist” in absence of having to appeal across group lines (Yaber 2007 [Interview]). However, as we have seen, open list systems and short term alliances do not have the potential for conflict management and moderation. Because the system does not produce long term, sustainable moderation, the reasons for adopting vote pooling are in doubt.

Additionally, Muslims find it hard to accept the underrepresentation of their community. Underrepresentation has contributed to the partly radicalization of the Shiite community because they feel underprivileged. The empirical findings therefore concur with O’Leary’s (2005:725) argument that overrepresentation of minorities combined with veto rights is problematic to majorities and affects democratic stability in a negative way. The Muslim community in Lebanon expresses its dissatisfaction with the descriptive representation of their community. The Muslim communities have responded to the Christian call for equitable representation arguing that the Christian community must choose between a representation that reflects the actual size of the communities and a continuation of the vote pooling system. Yet, Christians claim that their demographic share equal the Muslim one if Lebanese citizens abroad were allowed to vote. The Lebanese population residing abroad, holding a Lebanese citizenship, is significant. Rubeiz (2005) maintains that Christians constitute a majority of the Lebanese diaspora. Inclusion of Lebanese citizens living abroad would thus be a determining factor of the demos.
The analysis shows that both Muslims and Christians have felt underprivileged in the post-war period. It seems pertinent to conclude that overrepresentation of minorities does not necessitate substantive representativeness and is also problematic because it follows that another segment is underrepresented. Overrepresentation deviates from the criterion of representativeness (O’Leary 2003:725). Other mechanisms to ensure minority protection, such as predetermined posts in the executive and/or mutual veto, seem more appropriate.
6 Political Parties

Political parties are intended to ensure an organizational framework for the holding of elections (Powell 2000:4). In the absence of such a framework, citizens would not be able to effectively use elections as instruments of accountability or representativeness. Political parties in Lebanon have been active since the formation of the state in the early 1920s (Al-Khazen 2003:605), but have played a minor role historically (Suleiman 1967:685). Parties first began to campaign seriously for parliamentary office in 1960 and 1964. The important political agents in society were feudal lords, sect, clan, or family leaders instead. The traits and organization of political leadership varied according to community and region (Johnson 2001:25). In the rural areas, political leaders (Ar. zu’ama) were feudal lords and their legitimacy stemmed from family genealogies whereas in the urban areas the zu’ama came from notable merchant families of more recent ascension.

Political parties in post-war Lebanon are still institutionally and ideologically weak. Rabinovich (cited in Melhem 1996) contends that the Lebanese consociational system hinders the development of political parties.

The chapter is divided into two main parts that assess accountability and representativeness respectively. The chapter starts by investigating the reasons for the lack of partisan politics in Lebanon and argues that the open list system constitutes the main cause. Second, it examines internal party democracy and lack thereof within political parties and groups. Third, the chapter assesses voter-politician linkages concerning the prospects of an accountability-oriented culture. The chapter then analyzes recruitment structures. Finally, it analyzes the non-aggregation of national and secular interests. It concludes that shortcomings in political parties have undermined prospects of accountability and representativeness.
6.1 Prospects for Accountability

6.1.1 Individuals over Platforms

Political parties serve to link citizens to policy makers and individual candidates to collective policy commitment (Powell 2000:4). Thus they are paramount for the organizing of political participation of social groups (Huntington 1968). In contrast, Lebanon lacks a multi-party system similar to those found in functioning democracies (Al-Khazen 2003:605). The political process concentrates in party-based politics and non-partisan politics. Political parties’ influence was slightly rising after independence. Yet, political parties transformed into militias during the war, but reverted to their party status in 1992. The number of partisans versus non-partisans was at its peak in 1972, but their share of seats in Parliament gradually declined in the post-war period. Table 7 shows partisans and non-partisans in elections from 1972 until 2005. The Table shows a low share of partisans, albeit the 2005 share shows a rise. The next elections can show if this is a more persistent trend.

The minor role played by political parties in the post-war period results from institutional and social structures. The confessional system in general and the electoral system in particular, favour the importance of non-partisans over partisan candidates. First, the role played by electoral alliances/lists has been an important factor contributing to the situation of weak political parties (Knudsen 2005:8). The importance of electoral lists for electoral victory creates incentives for candidates to be affiliated with lists instead of political parties. Post-war electoral lists have been compiled by powerful sectarian leaders and by the Syrian regime until 2005. Non-partisan politics is favored because non-partisans can be included into various lists. Second, citizens vote for individual candidates and not for political parties on the electoral lists. Again non-

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18 I owe this expression to Paul Salem (2007 [Interview]).

19 The political parties all turned into militias with one exception, the National Bloc Party.
partisans may easily be included into several lists. As electoral lists are open, candidates run individually and each candidate’s total vote number determines electoral victory. This means that the candidates on the list are not tied together by a political program. As seen in the preceding chapter, the electoral lists entail tactical, short term alliances, often cross-ideological, and dissolve after the elections. Closed lists, in contrast, create incentives for more long term cooperation on the basis of a political program. Therefore, the open list system especially contributes to weaken political parties.

Table 7: Non-partisans in Parliament 1972–2005

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<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>Total Seats in Parliament</td>
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<td>128</td>
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<td>Percentage Partisans</td>
<td>31.31</td>
<td>25.78</td>
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Source: Based on Al-Khazen (2003) and Itani (2007).

Modern political parties link individual candidates to *collective policy commitment* (Powell 2000:4). Collective policy commitments, normally through political programs, are crucial to provide citizens with coherent choices. In Lebanon, citizens are not provided with coherent and stable choices because of non-partisan politics. Non-partisans are not tied to any political party or program, but most are affiliated with a parliamentary bloc. Still, there is no bloc law in parliament determining the bloc’s legality (Salem 2007 [Interview]). Non-partisans are thus not legally bound to vote with the bloc. The non-partisans that I interviewed told that in principle they can vote as they wish, and that they have voted against their blocs in some instances. Yet, keeping the bloc’s unity is the normal procedure.

Lack of clear and organized alternatives to incumbents weakens citizen control by limiting voters’ ability to learn about their alternative agents’ policy preferences. Knowledge of how agents will act during negotiations and in policy making is important for voters’ selecting of representative agents. Knowledge is equally important if the target of voting is a collective government.
Following the idea of Schmitter (2001), non-partisan politics may obstruct the formation of cabinets as elections may not give an indication of which political groups should be included in the government. In an authorized representation mode, however, focus will be on selecting various representative agents, not a collective cabinet (Powell 2000). Hence, the post-war electoral system – through the open list system and alliance making – has contributed to weaken an important institutional mechanism to ensure accountability.

6.1.2 Political Parties as the Personal Expression of Leaders

This section takes a closer look at the internal structure of political parties and how it affects accountability. Political parties’ internal structure can be cardinal for accountability. Internal party democracy can hold party leaders accountable because they are subject to internal elections (Katz 2006:35–36; Sisk 2001:132). Internal party democracy can therefore reduce agency floss. Analyzing political parties in pre-war Lebanon, Al-Khazen (2003:606) remarks that the absence of internal democratic practice characterizes parties and that “the internal organization, belief-system, and power structure of parties [were] not conducive to democratic practice, transparency, and accountability.” My findings concur with this picture. Interview data shows that political and/or sectarian leaders centralize and individualize decision making. Leaders may consult with a small decision-making group, but the leader controls the ultimate decision. This description was confirmed by my expert interviews. Below are some descriptions of the structure and decision making process within some Lebanese political groups:

“Theoretically speaking, it is the political bureau. Practically, they are not made in the political bureau. Practically, we have a small decision making center, Jumblatt [PSP leader], the ministers, and some of the MPs

20 I owe this expression to Zahar 2007 [Interview].
that work daily with Jumblatt […]. Whatever he decides, he does after consulting this decision-making center. But of course he is the main decision maker – the real decision maker.” [Wael Abou Faour, Deputy, PSP]

“The same thing takes place in each community – there is one person who takes the decision, Jumblatt, Hariri [Future leader]… It is not a democratic system in which every one participates […]. This is valid for all the political parties, although maybe a little less with Jumblatt, that sometimes, the deputies are not informed about decisions, and must learn about them in the press.” [Ahmad Fatfat, Minister, Future, my italics]

“We have a board of consultants. There is […] being formed down […] a kind of political bureau. Decisions will be taken there, but obviously the leader of the majority, Saad Hariri, will have a major share.” [Ghattas Khoury, former Deputy, Future]

“(We have elections) within the party and they are direct [elections]. There are no delegates – wherever the member finds himself, even abroad – can vote, through what we call a plenary session. We have a very well-organized system.” Elias Atallah, Deputy and DLM leader

“We don’t want it [Lebanese Option] as a party. We want it to be loose. We want to absorb many Shi’a figures. It’s a gathering. (…). No, [we don’t have a political program]. We are independent. We are self-sufficient. We are for creating a Lebanese state that belongs to the families of their country.” [Ahmad Al-Assad, LO leader]

Party leaders dominate decision making within most Lebanese political groups. “Party democracy will depend on whether activists have information on leader’s strategies and policies, can monitor their performance, and can reelect or dismiss them accordingly” (Marvall 1999:165). The fact that deputies sometimes are informed about party leaders’ decisions in the press show a severe lack of internal party democracy. When party members cannot monitor their leader’s activities, risks for moral hazard increase. In turn, citizen capacity to control politicians will suffer (Ibid:166). Instead of ensuring openness to political process, and an arena to promote opinions and influence,
political groups reinforce political leaders’ power. Interestingly enough, the new Shiite movement, LO, does not express a more democratic viewpoint on internal party democracy, and rather seem to wish to reinforce the traditional power structures related to familism.

However, the various parties certainly differ in their internal structure and decision making, compare for instance the decision making within DLM and Future reported above. The institutional structure and historical setting affect party leaders’ behavior and party strategies (van Biezen 2003:15–16). Political conduct and institutional structure are thus intertwined. In fact, many political groups in Lebanon have adopted recognizable structures of a political party, such as internal elections of the leadership and political bureaus. Examples are Kata’ib, NLP, LF, LCP, PSP, SSNP, Amal, and Hezbollah. However, the personality cult of political leaders characterizes political groups in Lebanon (Al-Khazen 2003). Thus, albeit “democratic institutions” may be present, these are not very effective due to a culture that values personalized political leadership.

Some political actors occupying elected office are not organized as political parties, but rather as movements or gatherings. Al-Khazen (2003:621–622) asserts that new forms of political organization emerged due to the Syrian regime’s repressive politics on political parties. Political parties, such as the NLP, Kata’ib, and the Free National Current (FNC), were systematically targeted. LF was banned, the LCP and the NB were allowed to operate, but were not allowed any representation (Ibid:613). The new movements or gatherings have tended to be broad-based and non-confessional, regrouping various actors such as politicians, non-partisans, political parties, business people, lawyers, academics, social activists, and journalists. Some of the movements have gained political representation such as the Democratic Renewal Movement (DRM) led by Nassib Lahoud, and the Qurnet Shehwan Gathering (QSG) led by the Maronite Patriarch Sfeir. Other movements have tried to influence the political system from the outside, such as the Democratic Forum led by Habib Sadiq and National Gathering for Salvation and Change led by Najah Wakim.

Consequently, the lines between political parties and movements in Lebanon are blurry. Huckshorn’s (cited in White 2006:5) defines a political party as “an autonomous
group of citizens having the purpose of making nominations and contesting elections in hope of gaining control over governmental power through the capture of public offices and the organization of the government”. Because the definition focuses on the objective of political organization, it would therefore include the looser gatherings in Lebanon. However, to have a consolidating effect on democracy, a political party should also have an organizational aspect. It should be “an institutionalized coalition, one that has adopted rules, norms, and procedures” (Aldrich cited in Ibid:6, my italics).

Some of the most important political groups in the post-war are Hezbollah, FPM, LF, and Future. These groups were new in the post-war period. Hezbollah and LF were established during the war as militias, but are new as political parties or groups contesting elections. These forces mobilize a significant portion of the population: Hezbollah within the Shiite community, Future in the Sunni community, and the FPM and the LF constitute the two main contenders within the Christian community (See Appendix 3 and 4). Kiwan (1994:57–72) claims that the post-Ta’if groups have adopted the same behavior as the pre-war political groups. According to Kiwan (2007 [Interview]), personalized, instead of institutionalized relations characterize these political groups. Their relations to voters are local and communitarian, rather than national. Hezbollah stands out from the other new political forces with a high level of institutionalized relations, albeit the party’s relations to the electorate are still local, personal, and communitarian. Future has been a rather loose association but is now in the process of turning into an official political party (Arab Media Watch [24.3.08]).

Thus, the lines between parties, groups, and gatherings are blurry. Political groups lack internal party democracy and leaders dominate decision making. Lack of institutionalized relations and internal party democracy contribute to undermine accountability.

6.1.3 The Elected Representative as a Social Intercessor

The nature of voter-politician linkages affects the opportunity for citizen control and accountability (Powell 2000). Because some linkages may produce a non-accountability oriented culture, these are important to assess. This section shows that voter-politician
linkages in Lebanon are influenced by clientelism, honor, and personalismo or charismatic authority.

My interview data shows that the deputy role is primarily perceived and experienced as a social intercessor. Providing social services to their respective constituencies was stated as one of the most important responsibilities by deputies. One deputy named this a social or administrative function (2007 [Interview]). The deputy functions as a social intercessor between the citizens and the state. My findings further show that a majority of the deputies have their own offices where citizens can meet and receive help on numerous issues. Moreover, deputies often establish NGOs, clubs, and etc. parallel to their political careers in order to serve their constituents, or in some cases, clients.

The role of the representative as a social intercessor is related to the term wasta. Wasta in a broad meaning refers to the goods and services obtained through informal patron-client networks (Huxley cited in Knudsen 2005:3). In weak states, wasta is prominent as a means to obtain benefits from government (Cunningham & Sarayrah 1993:1). In Lebanon, the consociational system has maintained and reinforced the traditional wasta-mechanism. The citizen does not have direct access to the state but needs his deputy as a mediator. The consociational system creates a middle level between the citizen and the state in which the citizen relate only to the state through his community only. The sectarian distribution of seats within the executive, legislature, and state administration hinders free access to the state.

Clientelistic accountability thus characterizes voter-politician linkages in Lebanon. According to Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007:4) in clientelistic societies where elections have been introduced, clients may gain more leverage in bargaining. In Lebanon, however, competition is limited in many electoral districts. Hence, elections strengthen the patron over the client rather than vice versa. Ziadeh (2006:146–147) claims that the “Lebanese citizen (…) has the choice either to succumb to becoming a political client to his communal representative or to emigrate.” The poor economic situation in the post-war period increases clientelistic linkages. There are great socio-economic and regional differences (Safi 2003:58). Salloukh 2007 [Interview] maintains that the country’s poor
economic situation has strengthened leaders’ positions, claiming that “[w]hen people are so poor; you can get anyone to vote for you”. The combination of limited electoral competition and a poor economic situation sustains the system’s clientelistic features.

Non-strategic relations also characterize voter-politician linkages. Honor, personalism, and charismatic authority, instead of political programs and ideas, partly determine political support. Historically, political leadership in Lebanon was associated with honor (Johnson 2001; Sharibi 1988). Inherited honor is still crucial in order to legitimate leadership by certain families, e.g. the Hariris and the Jumblatts. Linkages are based upon personalism: “the tendency of the politically active sectors of the population to follow or oppose a leader for personal, individual and family reasons, rather than because of the influence of a political idea, program, or party” (Suleiman 1967:686). Sharabi (1988:46) holds that citizens in Lebanon are “socialized into accepting the supremacy of the sectarian and communal leaders”. My expert interviews suggest that voter-politician relationships are a relation between leaders and followers. Most voter-politician relations are characterized by aspects of honor, personalism, like Hariri of the Future and Jumblatt of the PSP. It is pertinent to argue that Hezbollah voters relate to the party on the basis of charismatic leadership in many ways. Following the idea of Diana Kendall (2002:375), Hassan Nasrallah’s power is “legitimized on the basis of a leader's exceptional personal qualities or the demonstration of extraordinary insight and accomplishment, which inspire loyalty and obedience from followers”.

Voter-politician linkages based on clientelism change the principal-agent interaction because voters select certain representatives due to provision of services. Linkages based on honor, personalism, and charismatic authority elections are not part of an agency relationship. Elections do not serve to hold elected representatives accountable but corresponds to Fearon’s (1999:57–58) idea of “elections with no expectation of accountability”. Consequently, this contributes to undermine political parties and increase individual leadership.
6.2 Prospects for Representativeness

6.2.1 Recruitment Structures Restrict Voters’ Options

Modern political parties are essential in structuring political competition through nominating candidates for political office (Schmitter 2001:74–76). Recruitment structures determine political options, and thus affect substantive representativeness. In post-war Lebanon, recruitment to political office has been taken care of by sectarian leaders and the Syrian regime (Sallouk 2006, 2007). Electoral candidates are recruited on the basis of family, profession, or political party. Positions are often ‘inherited’ (Salem 2007 [Interview]). A look at the names of presidents, prime ministers, deputies, and cabinet members confirm that the same family names recur (Ziadeh 2006:146). Yet, every aspirant to political office needs to establish good relations with a ‘za‘īm’. All of the interviewed deputies and cabinet members were nominated after establishing a close relation to a za‘īm. As Marie-Joëlle Zahar (2007 [Interview]) put it, “you need to get under the wing of a za‘īm”. My findings therefore concur with studies of recruitment structures in the pre-war time (e.g. Harik 1975). That a few leaders only determine which candidates are to be on the electoral lists may result in an adverse selection problem. Lack of political competition, moreover, increases adverse selection problems. In effect, voters have little effective choice over candidates.

6.2.2 Non-Aggregation of National and Secular Interests

Aggregating interests is a fundamental function of modern political parties (Schmitter 2001:81–84). Aggregating the electorate’s interests is cardinal for substantive representativeness. Political parties should aggregate interests from a local to a national level. Two main aspects explain the non-aggregation of national interests by political parties in Lebanon. First, non-partisan politics impede the aggregation of national interests. When elected representatives are not attached to a political program with national objectives, they tend to stress local and particular interests over national ones.
In order to execute national objectives, individuals must commit to a collective policy commitment. Without a party framework, individuals cannot execute national policies.

Second, the predominance of sectarian parties prevents the aggregation of national interests. Critics of consociationalism opine that consociations only succeed in aggregating the sectarian interests on the expense of national interests, class, and socioeconomics (Ghai 2002; Horowitz 1985; Richani 1998). On one hand, proponents of integrative dynamics (e.g. Horowitz 1985) hold that consociations create incentives for the emergence of sectarian political parties. In particular, it is opined that sectarian distribution of seats in the legislature and state administration hardens sectarian identity. On the other hand, proponents of consociationalism (e.g. Lijphart 1977; Hanf 1993) maintain that the emergence of sectarian parties in consociations result from the societal structure of plural societies, and not the institutional structure, because they conceive sectarian identity as primordial or relatively immutable. According to Richani (1998:4) sectarian parties can become manifestations of sectarian conflict and delink citizens from the state. The remainder of the section discusses why secular political parties in Lebanon are poorly represented.

Political forces in Lebanon have tended to reflect the communal nature of society (Al-Khazen 2003:606). Secular parties have failed to get a substantial share of political representation in the post-war period. The secularizing trend that existed prior to 1975 was reversed by the outbreak of the war (Richani 1988:122). Secular parties in the pre-war period included the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), Ba’th Party (Ba’th), Syrian Social National Party (SSNP), Organization of Communist Work (OCW), and the Popular Democratic Party (PDP). In the post-war years, Democratic Left Movement (DLM) and Democratic Renewal (DR) have emerged as secular political forces. Sectarian parties can be defined as “those groups that recruit mainly from one sect or religion” (Ibid:120). Several parties in Lebanon whose voter bases are predominantly sectarian define themselves as secular, as opposed to religious parties such as Hezbollah. For the purpose of this thesis, I will adopt the former understanding of secular parties. Table 8 shows secular political forces’ representation in Lebanon 1972–2005.
Secular political forces have been disfavored by several factors in the post-war period that relate to the consociational system’s institutional determinants and the social structure of society (Richani 1998:135–136). This thesis argues that three main factors have resulted in the weak representation of secular forces in the post-war period: particular features of the consociational electoral system, the confessional structure of society, and the role played by the Syrian regime in Lebanese politics. However, although other factors than the consociational system are hence significant – confessionalism was reinforced and the Syrian role was facilitated through the institutional structure.

First, the Syrian occupation consolidated sectarianism because the regime aligned with sectarian representatives rather than with secular leftist parties. SSNP and the pro-Syrian wing of the Ba’th, however, were “loyal parties” and had permanent representation in Parliament (Al-Khazen 2003:613). The SSNP advocates pan-Syrianism, i.e. the ideology to unify a greater Syria including Cyprus, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria (Corstange 2000). It has had a considerable representation under the Syrian order, helped by the Syrian intelligence services. The Ba’th was split in a pro-Syrian and a pro-Iraqi fraction of which the latter was represented only, although its share was less considerable than the SSNP. The PSP was founded as a secular, socialist party under Kamil Jumblatt, but transformed into a sectarian one in its social base, political ideology, and behavior from 1949 to 1996 (Richani 1998:137). The conditions

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<td>7</td>
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Source: Al-Khazen (2003) and Itani (2007)

*PSP became a predominantly Druze party between 1992 and 1996.
for secular parties were unfavorable because the Syrian regime disallowed politicians from working freely and used coercive methods to constrain their actions. Secular parties were hindered from electoral competition, and some were also banned, for example the Pro-Iraqi Ba’th (Al-Khazen 2003:613). The Syrian regime’s involvement in alliance making discouraged secular parties’ representation. Alliances were imposed from Syria and unwanted alliances were hindered. For instance, the PSP was prevented from allying with the LCP and from including LCP deputies on its electoral list (Faour 2007 [Interview]). In addition, it was prohibited from electoral campaigning in the South, the Beqa’, and the North. PSP deputy Wael Abou Faour (Ibid) commented on the conditions for secular parties to operate under the Syrian order:

[D]uring the Syrian hegemony people were not allowed to participate in political life except through their sects. Our party was allowed to represent the Druze, but no more than that. Our comrades from the other sects were not allowed to work. And [PSP was neither] allowed to work in other areas or with other sects.

Second, people mobilize along segmental cleavages (Lijphart 1977:3–4). Khalaf (1987:118–120) emphasized that confessionalism and the way it intersects with norms such as familism, personalism, and clientelism, hinders the emergence of a democratic order. Moreover, sectarian divides may overlap with class divides which can make it increasingly hard for secular parties to overcome these (Richani 1998:28). In the pre-Ta’if period, most of the bourgeois class was drawn from the Christian communities, in particular the Maronites (Ibid:24–25). Richani (1998) argues that Lebanese secular parties failed to create a sufficiently cross-sectarian voter basis because of its inability to recruit Maronites. Most Lebanese secular parties are leftist parties. Historically, the Muslim communities have constituted the underprivileged classes. There were some changes during the 90s, but the Christian communities still remained predominant. Yet, in the latter years the gap between Muslims and Christians has been reduced, in particular with regard to the Sunni community.

Moreover, my findings suggest that people’s communal fear conditions support to secular parties. Instability and conflict favor the support to sectarian leaders because people view leaders as protectors when there is national disintegration. Support to
secular parties, at least under conflict and crisis, it thus limited. It also explains why citizens give support to sectarian over ‘national’ leaders. Secretary General to the National Liberal Party, Elias Bou Assi, (2007 [Interview, my translation] gives an insightful description of the basis for sectarian support:

If I have the choice between two [leaders], one from a traditional family and the other a self-made, self-taught man (...) it [my choice] will depend on the situation. If I – in my interior forte entailing my unconsciousness and my worries – I would analyze and find that I am threatened and a potential victim, I will not give priority to the one who might deserve it, who is brilliant. I will rather opt for the one who is – maybe not mediocre, but less brilliant – because he is able to regroup and get support from more people than the other. When do you start to reason in another way? When there is peace and you don’t feel threatened (...). I’m referring to my own situation and experience: How can I renounce ‘a Gemayel’ or ‘a Chamoun’ when they have more listeners than myself with the people who knows him and not me. Because I fear the future, I need a support. The one who can guarantee this is the one I will follow. Unfortunately, it’s like this.

Third, plurality voting disfavors political parties with regionally dispersed support as it is a first-past-the-post system. A few secular parties have had considerable membership, but their strength was seldom concentrated in one district, such as the LCP (Melhem 1996). In the 1996 elections the LCP failed to get any representatives although the party’s candidates received 140,000 votes of a total of 1,100,00 voters, i.e. about 13.5 percent (Richani 1998:115).

In sum, non-aggregation of national interests and sectarian parties’ low representation result from the consociational institutions and the plural societal structure. Non-aggregation of voters’ interests reduces substantive representativeness.
7 Consociation: A Challenging Formula

“(The electoral) law does not at any stage produce a real representation of the Lebanese people” (Rabib Haber 2007 [Interview]).

The aim of this thesis has been to empirically assess accountability and representativeness in the case of Lebanon in light of the theoretical debate on consociationalism. The state of the art literature argues that consociational institutions weaken accountability (e.g. Lustick 1997; Brass 1991) but strengthen representativeness (e.g. Lijphart 1977; Andeweg 2000). The study has analyzed accountability and representativeness in post-war Lebanon by looking at institutional mechanisms to ensure accountability and representativeness. Elections and political parties are mechanisms to ensure both of the latter. A grand coalition is an institution that intends to ensure representativeness whereas a parliamentary opposition ensures accountability.

7.1 Summary of Findings

My findings concur that consociationalism weakens accountability in several ways in Lebanon. The institutional structure of the Troika and big post-war cabinets limits Parliament’s monitoring role and control over the executive. This raises risks for moral hazard and thus weakens accountability. The structure of the executive branch and the opportunities for the three most significant segments to veto each other create incentives for opposition and conflict within the executive. The result is agency loss and fractionalized, incoherent decision making.

Alliance making seriously undermines the possibility for citizens to hold elected officials accountable through using elections as sanctioning or selecting devices. The Lebanese electoral system provides incentives for tactical and instrumental use by political, sectarian elites. The resulting cross-ideological, short term, and tactical alliances
lead to an absence of competition in general and a monopolization of political power in the Muslim communities in particular. Post-war alliances do not provide citizens with clear alternatives. Even more, alliances do not have the potential for conflict management and moderation because they are short term.

The electoral system contributes significantly to the situation of weak political parties. The open list system and the importance of alliances to electoral victory increase non-partisan politics. Non-partisans are unable to provide collective and coherent policy commitments to the electorate. The personality cult of leaders is reinforced by the system’s favoring of elite autonomy. The result is a low level of party democracy and domination by individual leaders. Thus in sum, all the institutional mechanisms intended to ensure accountability – a parliamentary opposition, elections, and political parties – are weakened by the consociational political system.

The picture for representativeness is more complex. The study finds that descriptive representativeness, in terms of sectarian representation, is partly guaranteed by consociational institutions in post-war Lebanon. The three most significant communities have been represented in the top executive Troika, and several smaller confessions have been represented though grand post-war cabinets. However, the predetermined ratio of seats does not correspond to actual population figures. Furthermore, political elites’ substantive representativeness, meaning that they mirror voters’ opinions, is questionable. The Troika members have not received majority or even plurality support within all the three segments during the post-war period.

The Christian community has showed great dissatisfaction with Christian representatives. Substantive representativeness suffers from vote pooling especially. Under the current system, the Christian community feels unable to elect the deputies who represent their opinions. The problem is worsened by sectarian elites’ compiling of electoral lists, often without regard for candidates’ popular bases. Muslim representatives reflect the opinions of their communities to a larger degree. Yet, the overrepresentation of Christians also produces Muslim dissatisfaction, especially within the Shiite community who has been underprivileged in the post-war period.
Lebanese political parties do not ensure substantive representativeness because of the predominance of individual and sectarian interests. The consociational system’s individualizing aspect results in weak political parties. Recruitment structures, moreover, limit voters’ options. Poor policy performance undermines substantive representativeness because elected officials are unable to solve national tasks such as economic and social disparities.

The analysis of accountability and representativeness in the case of Lebanon thus confirms the theoretical contention that consociational systems weaken accountability. Furthermore, the analysis shows that citizen control is undermined both according to proportional and majoritarian visions of how elections ensure citizen control. On the other hand, the analysis modifies the theoretical contention that consociation strengthens representativeness. The analysis of the post-war period demonstrates that achieving proportionality through predetermination of seats in the legislature and executive posts does not guarantee descriptive representativeness. Because the Christian community is overrepresented and the Muslim one is underrepresented, the Lebanese situation deviates from the principle of proportionality. The resulting power struggle between communities and dissatisfaction were reasons for questioning whether overrepresentation is a means to protect minorities. Furthermore, this thesis has especially questioned the argument that descriptive representativeness necessitates substantive representativeness. The analysis shows that in Lebanon, descriptive representation of the Christian community has not ensured substantive representativeness. The analysis, moreover, concurs with prevailing theory that accountability is necessary to ensure substantive representativeness.

7.2 Methodological Challenges

This study argues that the various institutional characteristics of the consociational political system have significantly weakened accountability and partly weakened substantive representativeness. To make such claims I have addressed rival explanations in the analysis when necessary. Some additional independent variables to the consociational ones (grand coalition, mutual veto, and proportionality) are included in
the analysis. Main additional variables are foreign interference, particularly the Syrian occupation, and Lebanon’s plural societal structure. Based on the analysis I argue that causal complexity exists and that the independent explanations should be seen as complementing rather than rivalling ones. The thesis argues that Syrian interference and the societal structure have contributed to undermining political elites’ accountability and representativeness. Because a case study design cannot measure partial relations (Andersen 1997), the estimation of the relative importance of the variables is based upon established theory. Concerning the relative importance of the Syrian interference, the case study has compared observations before and after the Syrian withdrawal, hence enabling control regarding alliance making. The analysis showed that alliance making still showed the same patterns. Control can be established regarding alliance making but not political parties whose development is a more long term process. In addition to addressing rival explanations, the validity of my findings is strengthened by a theoretically guided research design and data triangulation.

7.3 Undemocratic Consociation

O’Leary (2003, 2005) argues that political elites’ accountability and representativeness to the people determine whether a consociation should be labelled democratic or undemocratic. My findings suggest that Lebanese political elites are neither accountable nor very representative indeed. Accountability and representativeness, however, are not dichotomous variables and it is thus hard to assert whether Lebanon is an undemocratic consociation or merely a very weak one. According to O’Leary’s criterion, this study draws the conclusion that Lebanon can be labelled an undemocratic consociation.

O’Leary (2003, 2005) holds that consociations are democratic when they do not preclude electoral competition but merely turn it intra-sectarian. This analysis suggests a modification of this contention. In Lebanon’s case, an absence of intra-sectarian competition is the general picture. The analysis also shows that there is significant inter-sectarian competition in between elections.
7.4 Relevance and Generalization

The theoretical and practical challenges posed by plural societies face scholars and practitioners. Determining which type of institutional structure that best ensures democratic transitions and consolidation of democracy in plural societies, is at the core. This thesis’s backdrop is the critique of the quality of democracy in consociations. The question to be asked is: Are consociations ipso facto undemocratic or is only the Lebanese consociation undemocratic?

This study argues that Lebanese consociation is not unique as a case. It thus argues that there are some general relationships between consociational institutions that weaken accountability. It is therefore interesting to see if some of the main patterns found in the Lebanese case apply to other cases. One description of Dutch consociation found in Lijphart (1968:177) suggests the same patterns of accountability as the Lebanese ones.

“Elections are said to be meaningless because the voters are not presented clear alternatives. Issues are not sharply defined, and responsibility for past governmental policy cannot be plainly determined because of the fuzzy line between government and opposition parties. And when, occasionally, the voters do happen to get the opportunity to make a real choice, their verdict may be disregarded by the parties of the establishment in the formation of a new cabinet”.

As seen in this thesis, the description of Dutch consociation could very well have been applied to the Lebanese case. However, generalizing is always uncertain, but democratic consociations can, at least, be considered a challenging formula. Several studies of consociations have focused on the lack of accountability. This study has also focused on representativeness. The analysis demonstrates that consociational systems may not lead to descriptive representativeness because of predetermination of seats and overrepresentation of minorities. Advocates of consociationalism argue that self-determination is better than predetermination (O’Leary 2003; Lijphart 1991a). However, few studies explicitly focus on the relation between descriptive and substantive representativeness in consociations. This study shows that descriptive representativeness
does not necessarily lead to substantive representativeness. Assessing whether the same patterns of representativeness as the Lebanese ones can be found in other consociations is thus an objective for further studies.
Appendix 1

List of Interviewees

Al-Assad, Ahmad  Leader, Lebanese Option Gathering; Shiite.

Assi, Dr. Elias Bou  Secretary General, National Liberal Party; Member, Comité de Suivie de 14 mars; Professor of Political Science, Université Saint Joseph; Christian.


Fatfat, Dr. Ahmad  Minister of Youth and Sports (2005–); Member, Future Tide Movement Bloc; Deputy Dinnieh (2000–2005); Minister of Interior (February–November 2006, par interim); Sunni.

Gebara, Dr. Khalil  Co-executive Director, Lebanese Transparency Association.

Haber, Rabih  Managing Director, Statistics Lebanon.
Hogassapian, Jean  
Minister of State for Administrative Planning (2005–); Deputy Beirut 3 (2000, 2005–); Member, Future Tide Movement Bloc; Armenian Orthodox.

Jaber, Yassine  
Deputy Nabatieh, South Electoral District, (1996, 2000, 2005–); Non-partisan; Member, Berri's Resistance and Development Bloc; Minister of Economy and Trade (May 1995–November 1996); Shiite.

Khoury, Dr. Ghattas  
Deputy Beirut 1, Beirut Electoral District, (2000–2005); Member, Future Tide Movement Bloc; Maronite.

Pharaon, Michel  
Minister of Parliamentary Affairs (2005–); Member, Future Tide Movement Bloc; Deputy Beirut 1, Beirut Electoral District, (1996, 2000, 2005–); Minister (October 2000– April 2003); Member, Greek Catholic Superior Council Greek Catholic.

Karamé, Dr. Elias  
Vice President to Kata’ib President Pierre Gemayel (1980–84); President, Kata’ib (1984–1986); Leader, Opposition Kata’ib; Member, Qurnet Shehwan; Greek Catholic.

Al-Khazen, Dr. Farid  
Deputy Keserwen, Mount Lebanon Electoral District (2005–); Member, Free Patriotic Movement Parliamentary Bloc; Professor of Political Science, American University of Beirut; Maronite.

Kiwan, Dr. Fadia  
Director, Institut des Sciences Politiques, Université Saint Joseph.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position and Affiliations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Osseiran, Ali Abdel</td>
<td>Deputy Sidon-Zahrani, South Electoral District (1992, 1996, 2000, 2005–); non-partisan; Member, Speaker Berri’s Liberation and Development Bloc; Minister of State (October 1992–May 1995); Shiite.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salem, Dr. Paul</td>
<td>Director, Carnegie Middle East Center; Former Member, National Commission on Electoral Law.</td>
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<td>Salloukh, Dr. Bassel F.</td>
<td>Assistant Professor of Political Science, American Lebanese University.</td>
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<td>Touma, Michel</td>
<td>Editor, L’Orient-Le Jour, Lebanon.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zahar, Dr. Marie-Joelle</td>
<td>Professor of Political Science, University of Montreal, Canada; Visting Professor, Université Saint Joseph, Lebanon.</td>
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## Appendix 2

### Table of Main Political Parties and Groups in the Post-War Period

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<tr>
<th>Political Party/Group</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Communal Representation</th>
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<td>National Liberal Party (NLP)</td>
<td>Dory Chamoun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reform Kata’ib</td>
<td>Amine Gemayel</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Kata’ib</td>
<td>Elias Karamé</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)</td>
<td>Walid Jumblatt</td>
<td>Druze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Bloc Party (NB)</td>
<td>Raymond Eddé (–2000); Carlos Eddé (2000–)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Nabih Berri</td>
<td>Shiite</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>Hassan Nasrallah</td>
<td>Shiite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Movement (Future)</td>
<td>Rafic Hariri (–2005); Sa’ad Hariri (2005–)</td>
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<td>Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)</td>
<td>Michel Aoun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Movement (DLM)</td>
<td>Elias Atallah</td>
<td>Secular</td>
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</table>

\(^{21}\) The majority of the voter basis belongs to respective confession/community

\(^{22}\) Two factions, Reform Kata’ib and Opposition Kata’ib, have opposed the party leadership from the 1990s. The party entered a reconciliation process in 2005.
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Secular</th>
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<td>Ba’ath Party (Ba’ath)</td>
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<td>Secular</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tashnag</td>
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<td>Armenian</td>
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<td>Hanchag</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ramgavar</td>
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<td>Armenian</td>
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Source: Based on interviews with politicians and experts in Lebanon (2007) and Al-Khazen (2003).
## Appendix 3

### Table of Parliamentary Elections 1972–2005

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<td>Tripoli coalition</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Al-Khazen (2003) and Itani (2007).

Note: This Table does not show bloc members, but members of political groups.
## Appendix 4

### Table of Major Blocs in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bloc Name</th>
<th>Deputies (total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Future Movement Bloc</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloc of Resistance (Hezbollah)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation and Development Bloc (Amal)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement Bloc</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party Bloc</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Itani (2007)
Bibliography

Note: Arabic names are listed according to the surname and not the preceding article, for instance (Al)-Khazen.


Haber, Rabih (2007). Interview, November 15, Beirut, Lebanon.


Yaber, Jassine (2007). Interview, December 17, Beirut, Lebanon.

